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Broadly, this thesis attempts to extend the current literature to give a better 
understanding of loss aversion in housing market. And secondly, it also attempts to 
examine the price anomaly in real estate auction. Lastly, it intends to bridge the 
knowledge gap by examining whether observed price “anomalies” diminish in a 
repeated market environment.  
 
This thesis is motivated based on the greater difficulty of standard economic theory 
to understand individual choice behavior. In standard economic theory, it relies on 
expected utility maximization, which implies that economic agents are capable of 
correctly identifying and maximizing their utility functions. It also assumes 
unlimited information processing capabilities. In other words, economic agents are 
rational. For instance, economic theory predicts that the prices that a person will 
pay to buy and sell an object should be about the same. But numerous experiments 
have shown that there is a large disparity between selling and buying prices. These 
are usually term as “anomalies” in economic theory. These “anomalies” depart from 
the optimal judgment and decision making. 
 
In the recent years, there are numerous efforts to capture psychologically more 
realistic notions of human nature into economics and finance. This is commonly 
labeled under the rubric “behavioral economics” and “behavioral finance.” The goal 
of psychological economics and finance is to investigate behaviorally grounded 




This thesis is mooted on the individual choice behavior by providing it with more 
realistic psychological foundations. It is based on the behavioral economics 
theories.  
 
An important groundwork on behavioral economics came from the prospect theory. 
The theory is developed by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. It is this theory that 
paved the development of behavioral economic and finance. The theory showed 
how judgement under uncertainty departs from the assumption of rationality. Unlike 
expected utility theory, prospect theory is descriptive and developed in an inductive 
way from empirical observations. Basically, individuals maximised weighted sum 
of utilities, which are determined by what Kahneman and Tversky call “value 
function”  
 
There are three main differences between the value function in prospect theory and 
utility function in expected utility theory. First, unlike utility function which is 
concerned with final values of wealth per se, prospect theory is concerned with 
changes in wealth, relative to a given reference point. Second, the slope of value 
function is asymmetric between gains and losses; the value function declines more 
for a given loss than it rises for a gain of the same amount. That is it is concave for 
gains and convex for losses. However, for utility function, the slope is smooth and 
concave throughout. Third, for both gains and losses, the marginal value for a 
change in wealth declines with the magnitude of the change. That is, people behave 
as if they regard extremely improbable events as impossible and extremely probable 




As mentioned earlier, one of the thesis objectives is to provide a greater 
understanding of loss aversion in housing market. Loss aversion is proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect theory. This is based on the idea 
that the mental penalty experienced by an individual or agent associated with a 
given loss is greater than the mental reward from a gain of the same size. If 
investors are loss averse, they may be reluctant to realize losses.  
 
Hence unlike the utility function in expected utility theory which is taken to be 
smooth and concave everywhere, the value function in the prospect theory is S-
shaped. It is concave for gains and convex for losses, displaying diminishing 
sensitivity to change in both directions. Furthermore, it has a kink at zero, being 
steeper for small losses than for small gains. 
 
So far, many works have been done for loss aversion. However, they are all 
experimental studies. For instance, the experimental work by Knetsch (Knatch) and 
Tversky and Kahneman support loss aversion.  
 
Given that the works on loss aversion are carried out using experiments, the results 
are hence sensitive to: 
(1) Who participates and nature of instructions  
(2) The types of auction  
 
In the housing market, the research of loss aversion is very limited. The first paper 
on loss aversion in the housing market is by Genesove and Mayer (2001). Using 
data on Boston condominium sales, they find that house owners are loss averse 
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using transaction and list prices and time to sale. They also find that loss aversion is 
not a uniform aspect of participants in housing markets. Basically, investors exhibit 
less loss aversion than owners.  
 
An often-noted characteristic of housing markets that sets them apart from other 
asset markets is the positive correlation between housing prices and transaction 
volume. Stein (1995) argues that credit market imperfections that impose 
downpayment constraints on buyers can explain this phenomenon. In contrast, 
Engelhardt demonstrate that loss aversion as an alternative explanation for this 
phenomenon.  
 
The housing market is a fruitful place to test loss aversion because it is an 
infrequently traded asset. Unlike common goods such as pens and mugs, a person 
only gets to buy or sell a property few times in their life. Furthermore, housing is 
held for both investment and consumption purposes. The transaction data also allow 
researchers to identify asset acquisition and disposition dates and hence losses are 
measurable, which has been the challenge for other asset classes.  
This thesis uses auction data on housing from Singapore. Auction mechanisms have 
been extensively used as it provides an excellent platform for a better understanding 
of human behavior. Unlike many other studies that use experiments, the data set 
used in this thesis are actual auction data.  
 
In the first part of the thesis, there are two research questions that attempts to 
examine on loss aversion. Firstly, what is the relevant reference point for evaluating 
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losses in a prospect theory framework? Secondly, how does the sensitivity to loss 
vary across different types of sellers? 
 
The first part of the thesis attempts to make two primary contributions to the 
literature. First, we provide empirical evidence on the relevant reference point for 
prospect theory, specifically we examine whether losses are evaluated relative to the 
acquisition prices or the highest possible price the owner could have received over 
the holding period/recent past. 
 
Second, we examine whether there are differences in the extent of loss aversion 
across types of sellers. Genesove and Mayer (2001) compare owner-occupiers and 
investors; we extend this to look at the difference between individual (owners) 
sellers and institutional sellers. Institutional sellers are expected to be less sensitive 
to loss aversion than are individuals, be it they are more experienced or less 
emotionally connected to the unit. Individual sellers, on the other hand, are 
expected to be loss averse.  
 
  
Our results suggest that loss aversion is evident. Probably our most robust result is 
that the relevant reference point for measuring the change in the value function is 
not the initial nominal purchase price, but rather the highest value. There are strong 
evidences for the reference points to be both the highest price and highest price over 
the most recent past.  Our other findings include that institutions are less susceptible 
to loss aversion than individuals.  Both prices and time to sale time to sale increase 
more for individuals than for institutions as the likely loss increases.  Like 
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Genesove and Mayer (2001) we get a clear positive relationship between potential 
loss and the time to sale, where we measure this in a duration framework as the 
hazard for the probability of sale.  We also find that loss aversion is not present for 
all sellers in housing markets.  The motivated sellers do not hold out for higher 
prices.  However, they do take longer to sell their units.  A more robust finding is 
that experienced sellers, that is, institutions selling foreclosed units, are less affected 
by loss aversion than are individuals. 
 
The second part of the thesis focuses on the price anomalies observed in auction. 
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) attributed their findings for price premium as 
evidence of the “winner’s curse.” Winner’s curse is a phenomenon where under 
certain assumptions, successful bidders pay more than an item’s expected market 
value. On the other hand, Mayer (1995) attributed the discount to be the quick sale 
under the auction mechanism that results in poorer match between the buyer and 
house. 
 
Foreclosed properties are usually sold at a discount (Shilling et al., 1990; Forgey et 
al., 1994; Hardin and Wolverton, 1996, Pennington-Cross, 2006). Hence, one 
problem in reaching any conclusion from this work might be the difficulty of 
differentiating the stigma of foreclosure associated with auctioned properties. As 
the auction data from Singapore consists of both sales by institution and individual 
owner, this thesis will be able to back out the pure foreclosure effect from the 
aggregate auction effect. This will provide a clearer understanding on the 
interaction between the winner’s curse associated with auction and the well 




The research questions that the second part of the thesis attempts to examine 
include (1) Is there any interaction between the phenomenon of expected premium 
at auction and discount for foreclosed properties; (2) Is price premium/discount 
uniform across market participants? Any differences due to bargaining power? (3) 
Between high and low rise properties, what is the extent of under-maintenance and 
asymmetric information that cause foreclosed properties to transact at a discount, 
that is, is there pure discount for foreclosed properties? (4) In the price discovery 
process, is there any price anomaly for units that are not sold at non-pooled auction 
but subsequently sold through private negotiation? Has bidders gained experience at 
auction?  
 
The results shed clear light on the existence of a premium or discount for auction 
sales, but also the relationship between under-maintenance and asymmetric 
information on unit quality and the price of units sold at foreclosure. 
 
The third part of the thesis looks into whether anomalies behavior survives in a 
repeated market environment. In behavioral economics and finance, many 
anomalies behavior have been found but it is a one-off decision. Hence, some 
economists question the reliability of the findings as there are also some findings 
that showed the patterns of behavior that conformed to the standard economic 
theory. Hence, some economists have thereby argued that anomalies behavior is 
significant if it survives in an environment in which individuals repeatedly face the 




In this section, we will focus on loss aversion and the question to ask is basically 
“Whether loss aversion dissipates with repeated auctions?” We are extending the 
section on loss aversion to further examine this research question. Interestingly it is 
found in our research that anomalies do disappear with repeated auctions. However, 
the adversity of loss is independent of the number of auction attempts. 
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This thesis is motivated based on the greater difficulty of standard economic theory 
to understand individual choice behavior. In standard economic theory, it relies on 
expected utility maximization, which implies that economic agents are capable of 
correctly identifying and maximizing their utility functions. It also assumes 
unlimited information processing capabilities. In other words, economic agents are 
rational. For instance, economic theory predicts that the prices that a person will 
pay to buy and sell an object should be about the same. But numerous experiments 
have shown that there is a large disparity between selling and buying prices. These 
are usually term as “anomalies” in economic theory (Camerer, 1995 and Starmer, 
2000). These “anomalies” depart from the optimal judgment and decision making. 
 
There are many assumptions in economic and financial theory make about human 
nature that behavioral and psychological research suggests are often importantly 
wrong. These include the assumptions that people 
 Are Bayesian information processors; 
 Have well-defined and stable preferences; 
 Maximize their expected utility; 
 Apply exponential discounting weighting current and future well-being; 
 Are self-interested, narrowly defined; 
 Have preferences over final outcomes, not changes; 
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 Have only “instrumental”/functional taste for beliefs and information 
 
In the recent years, there are numerous efforts to capture psychologically more 
realistic notions of human nature into economics and finance. This is commonly 
labeled under the rubric “behavioral economics” and “behavioral finance.” The goal 
of psychological economics and finance is to investigate behaviorally grounded 
departures from these assumptions that seem economically relevant. 
 
The idea that economists should incorporate behavioral evidence from psychology 
and elsewhere that indicate systematic and important departures from our 
discipline’s habitual assumptions is so fundamentally and manifestly good 
economies (Rabin, 2002).  
 
This thesis is mooted on the individual choice behavior by providing it with more 




1.2 Evaluating Behavioral Economics 
 
Stigler (1965) says economic theories should be judged by three criteria: 
congruence with reality, generality and tractability. Theories in behavioral 
economics should be judged this way too. The ultimate test of a theory is the 
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accuracy of its predictions and better predictions are likely to result from theories 
with more realistic assumptions.  
 
Theories in behavioral economics also strive for generality – e.g. by adding only 
one or two parameters to standard models. Particular parameter values then often 
reduce the behavioral model to the standard one, and the behavioral model can be 
pitted against the standard model by estimating parameter values. And once 
parameter values are pinned down, the behavioral model can be applied just as 
widely as the standard one.  
 
Adding behavioral assumptions often does make the models less tractable. 
However, many of the papers show that it can done. Moreover, despite the fact that 
they often add parameters to standard models, behavioral models, in some cases, 
can even be more precise than traditional ones which assume more rationality, when 
there is dynamics and strategic interaction (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003).  
 
The realism, generality and tractability of behavioral economics can be illustrated 
with the example of loss aversion. Loss aversion is the disparity between the strong 
aversion to losses relative to a reference point and the weaker desire for gains of 
equivalent magnitude. Loss aversion is more realistic than the standard continuous, 
concave, utility function over wealth, as demonstrated by hundreds of experiments.  
 
Loss aversion has proved useful in identifying where prediction of standard theories 
will go wrong: Loss aversion can help account for the equity premium puzzle in 
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finance and asymmetry in price elasticities. Loss aversion can also be parameterized 
in a general way, as the ratio of the marginal disutility of a loss relative to the 
marginal utility of a gain at the reference point (that is, the ratio of the derivatives at 
zero); the standard model is the special case in which this “loss aversion 
coefficient” is one. As the foregoing suggests, loss aversion has proved tractable – 
although not always simple – in several recent application. 
 
 
1.3 Standard Economic Theory v. Behavioral Economic Theory 
 
Starting with the 1960s, the findings on psychology began finding its way into the 
analysis of investment behavior. The goal of behavioral finance is to make 
economic models better at explaining systematic investor decisions, taking into 
consideration their emotions and cognitive errors and how these influence decision 
making.  
 
An important groundwork on ‘anomalies’ behavior came from the prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which paved the development of behavioral 
economic and finance. In this theory, it showed how judgment under uncertainty 
systematically departs from the assumption of rationality as assumed by modern 
financial theory, using evidence from experimental research. While expected utility 
theory is axiomatic, their prospect theory is descriptive, developed in an inductive 
way from empirical observations. In prospect theory, individuals maximized 
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weighted sum of utilities, which are determined by what Kahneman and Tversky 
call “value function”.  
 
There are three main differences between value function and utility function in 
expected utility theory.  
 
First, in prospect theory, the decision maker is not concerned with final values of 
wealth per se, but with changes in wealth, relative to some reference point. This 
reference point is often the decision maker’s current level of wealth, so that gains 
and losses are defined relative to the status quo. But the reference level can also be 
some aspiration level: a wealth level the subject strives to acquire, given his or her 
current wealth and expectations. 
 
The second difference relative to expected utility theory concerns the value 
function. In addition to being defined over changes in wealth, this function is S-
shaped. Thus it is concave for gains and convex for losses, displaying diminishing 
sensitivity to change in both directions. Furthermore, it has a kink at zero, being 
steeper for small losses than for small gains. Utility function in expected utility 
theory, by contrast, is usually taken to be smooth and concave everywhere. 
 
The third difference is in weights that are not same as probabilities, but are 
determined by a function of true probabilities which gives zero weight to extremely 
low probabilities and a weight of one to extremely high probabilities. That is, 
people behave as if they regard extremely improbable events as impossible and 
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extremely probable events as certain. However, events that are just very improbable 
(not extremely improbable) are given too much weight; people behave as if they 
exaggerate the probability. Events that are very probable (not extremely probable) 
are given too little weight; people behave as if they underestimate the probability 
(Shiller, 1999). These differences make prospect theory consistent with the 
experimental evidence.  
 
In essence, the goal of behavioral economics and finance is to increase the 
explanatory power of economics and finance by providing it with more realistic 
psychological foundations. As quoted from Rabin (2002), “the idea that economists 
should incorporate behavioral evidence from psychology and elsewhere that 
indicate systematic and important departures from our discipline’s habitual and 
assumptions is so fundamentally and manifestly good economics.” 
 
 
1.4 Real Estate Auction Data 
 
So far, many works have been done on behavioral economics. However, they are all 
experimental studies. This is because experimental control is exceptionally helpful 
for distinguishing behavioral explanations from standard ones. For example, players 
in highly anonymous one-shot-take-it-or-leave-it “ultimatum” bargaining 
experiments frequently reject substantial monetary offers, ending the game with 
nothing (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). Offers of 20% or less of a sum are rejected 
about half the time, even when the amount being divided is several weeks’ wages or 
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$400 in the U.S (e.g. Camerer, 2002). Suppose we observe this phenomenon in the 
field, in the form of failures of legal case to settle before trial, costly divorce 
proceedings, and labor strikes. It would be difficult to tell whether rejection of 
offers was the result of reputation-building in repeated games, agency problems 
(between clients and lawyers), confusion or an expression of distaste for being 
treated unfairly. In ultimatum game experiments, the first three of these 
explanations are ruled out because the experiments are played once anonymously, 
have no agents, and are simple enough to rule out confusion. Thus, the experimental 
data clearly establish that subjects are expressing concern for fairness. Other 
experiments have been useful for testing whether judgment errors which individuals 
commonly make in psychology experiments also affect prices and quantities in 
markets. 
 
However, the major drawback from experiments is that the results obtained are 
highly sensitive to the participants and nature of instructions.  
 
Hence, one major contribution of this thesis is to apply insights from psychology 
and other behavioral sciences using actual auction data. Auction mechanisms have 
been extensively used as it provides an excellent platform for a better understanding 
of human behavior. For instance, the studies on willingness to accept (WTA) and 
willingness to purchase (WTP) disparity by Harless (1989), Kahneman et al. (1990) 
and Shogren et al. (1994). The results obtained from this data will be cleaner and 
more straightforward to enable us to understand the behavior of participants. 
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Furthermore, it will help us rule away the sensitivity of participants and nature of 
instructions that were experienced in experiments.  
 
Auction data on housing will be used in this thesis. This gives us important new 
insights into property investors, their investment decisions and the behavior of real 
estate markets. In addition, unlike previous studies which use auction of common 
goods such as pens and mugs, it will be interesting to see how human behavior 
differs when it comes to sale and purchase of a durable good as compared to 
common goods. Also, housing is held for both investment and consumption 
purpose. Moreover, unlike common goods, a person only gets to buy or sell a 
property few times in their life. Furthermore, real estate auction, in particular, has 
an attraction in that it provides a centralized platform for buyers and sellers in an 
otherwise highly decentralized real estate marketplace.  
 
In addition, the housing market is a fruitful place to test certain “anomalies” such as 
loss aversion because transaction data allows researchers to identify asset 
acquisition and disposition dates, which has been the challenge for other asset 
classes.  Unlike equities, housing is a search market, so certain behavior will 
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1.5 Thesis’s Objectives 
 
The objectives of this thesis are basically as follow: 
 To identify the relevant reference point for evaluating losses in a prospect 
theory framework 
 To determine whether the sensitivity to loss vary across different types of 
sellers 
 To provide a clearer understanding on the interaction between the winner’s 
curse associated with auction and the well documented finding on discount 
for foreclosed properties 
 To examine the differences in the extent of price premium/discount between 
institution sellers of defaulted properties and owner-sellers who view 
auctions as an alternative sale mechanism 
 To identify the extent to which under-maintenance, asymmetric information 
or bargaining power cause housing units sold because of foreclosure to 
transaction at a discount 
 
 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
 
The rest of the study is organized in the following manner. The next section covers 
the whole spectrum of literature on behavioral economics and finance. Section 3 
gives provides literature review on auction and a discussion on Singapore real estate 
auction mechanism with brief introduction on the auction data. Section 4 covers the 
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section on loss aversion to address the first two objectives listed above. Section 5 
examines the price anomalies observed in auction to address the rest of the 
objectives. Section 6 seeks to examine the behavioral psychology in repeated 
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2.0 Literature on Behavioral Economics/Finance  
 
There is a whole spectrum of literature on behavioral economics and finance in the 
last thirty years. For simplicity, this thesis has followed Hirshliefer (2001) approach 
by classifying the literature into three categories: heuristic simplification, self-
deception and emotion loss of control.  
 
 
2.1 Heuristic Simplification 
 
Heuristic1 simplification stems from limited attention, memory and processing 
capacities, and also from unconscious association. It also includes narrow framing – 
analyzing problems in a too isolated fashion. 
 
Selective triggering of associations causes salient and availability effects. An 
information signal is salient if it has characteristics that are good at capturing our 
attention or at creating associations that facilitate recall. Availability bias is the 
tendency to base decisions on the most readily available information, resulting in 
disproportionately high weight assigned to easily remembered information (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1973). 
 
                                                 
1  Heuristics is a method of solving problems by evaluating past experiences and moving by 
trial and error to a solution. 
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The halo effect causes people to misrepresent one characteristics of a person or a 
thing for another. This effect could cause stock market mispricing. In an efficient 
market, a stock being good in terms of growth prospects says nothing about its 
prospects for future risk-adjusted returns. If people misattribute stocks earnings 
prospect for its return prospects, growth stocks will be overpriced.  
 
The illusion of truth is the finding that people are more inclined to accept the truth 
of a statement that is easy to process. People also tend to choose friends that are just 
like them. According to evolutionary psychology, people prefer familiar and similar 
individuals because these were indicators of genetic relatedness. These biases 
suggest a tendency to prefer local investments. 
 
Magical thinking is the belief in relations between casually unrelated actions or 
events. A type of magical thinking called illusion of control consists of the belief 
that a person can favorably influence unrelated chance events. 
 
In narrow framing, problems are analyzed in a too isolated fashion, and in context 
effect the presence of an unselected choice alternative affects which alternative is 
selected. Mental accounting is a kind of narrow framing that involves keeping track 
of gains and losses related to decisions in separate mental accounts. It can explain 
why some people have low paying investments and high interest debts at the same 
time. 
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Disposition effect is a tendency to hold on securities that have declined in value and 
to sell winners. Related is the self-deception theory in which the self-deceiver 
avoids recognizing losses and regret aversion. According to expected utility theory, 
utility derives solely from the probability distribution of payoffs resulting from a 
choice. However, people seem to be regret averse in their choices. They seem to be 
concerned not just that a choice may lead to low consumption, but that consumption 
may be lower than the outcome provided by an alternative choice. Regret is stronger 
for decisions that involve action rather than passivity, an effect sometimes called 
the omission bias. Regret aversion can explain the endowment effect, a prefer for 
people to hold on to what they have rather than exchange for a better alternative, as 
with the refusal of individual of individuals to swap a lottery ticket for an equivalent 
one plus cash. The status quo bias involves preferring the choice designated as the 
default or status quo among a list of alternatives. 
 
Loss aversion bias suggests that people are more averse to small losses, relative to a 
reference level, than attracted to the gains of the same size (about twice as much). 
 
Anchoring is the phenomenon that people tend to be overly influenced in their 
assessment of some quantity by arbitrary quantities in the statement of problem, 
even when the quantities are uninformative. It means that when estimate is made in 
the presence of a potential anchor, it tends to be too close to the anchor. Anchoring 
phenomenon has been confirmed in many experiments, and from them it can be 
extracted that many economic phenomena are influenced by anchoring, especially 
valuations in the markets that are inherently ambiguous, such as stock markets. If 
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people form judgments about investments interdependently and are overconfident, 
their noise trading will cause speculative prices to deviate from their true values. 
 
Representativeness involves assessing the probability of a state of the world based 
on the degree to which the evidence is perceived as similar to or typical of the state 
of the world (Hirshleifer, 2001). Kahneman and Tversky (1974) give interesting 
illustration of this bias. To subjects they presented this description of a person 
named Linda: 
 
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination 
and social justice and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.” 
 
When asked which of “Linda is a bank teller” (statement A) and “Linda is a bank 
teller and is active in the feminist movement” (statement B) is more likely, subjects 
typically assign greater probability to B. of course, joint probability of these 
statements cannot be greater than probability of any one of those statements. 
Representativeness provides a simple explanation. The description of Linda sounds 
like the description of a feminist – it is representative of feminist – leading subjects 
to pick B. 
 
Gambler’s fallacy is the belief that in an independent sample, the recent occurrence 
of one outcome increases the odds that the next outcome will differ. For example, 
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when coin is tossed, people tend to think if the toss one was heads, the next one has 
above the average to be tail. 
 
Clustering illusion appears when people perceive random clusters as reflecting a 
casual pattern. People mistakenly believe in ‘hot hands’ in basketball, even though 
empirically actual performance of the players is very close to serially independent. 
Similarly, they tend to believe that, if a money manager has above the average 
performance for two years in a row, he has above the average capabilities. There is 
also evidence that real estate and stock market investors extrapolate trends in 
forecasting price movements. 
 
Conservatism appears when in the face of new evidence, individuals do not change 
their beliefs as much as would be rational. Actually, the more useful the evidence, 
bigger the gap between actual updating and rational updating appears to be. One 
explanation for conservatism is that processing new information and updating 
beliefs is costly. There is evidence that information that is presented in a cognitively 
costly form (information that is abstract and statistical, for example) is weighed 
less. On the other hand, people may overreact to information that is easily processed 
(such as scenarios and concrete examples).  
 
Modern finance theory assumes that agents have predetermined well defined 
preferences. Number of experiments has shown the existence of preference 
reversals. There is also evidence that preferences depend on a way they are 
presented to the agents. Preference reversals imply the violation of transitivity (x is 
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preferred to y and y is preferred to z, but z is preferred to x). These findings can be 
applied in the market context. For instance, the idea that the market allocates 
resources to their best possible use would be undermined if agents’ preferences are 
affected by the market mechanism itself.  
 
The disjunction effect is a tendency for people to want to wait to make decisions 
until information is revealed, even if the information is not really important for the 
decision, and even if they would make the same decision regardless of the 
information. Shiller (1999) argues that the disjunction effect might help explain 
changes in the volatility of speculative asset prices or changes in the volume of 
trade of speculative asset prices at times when information is revealed. Thus, for 
example, the disjunction effect can be in principle explain why there is sometimes 
low volatility and low of trade just before an important announcement is made, and 
high volatility or volume of trade after the announcement is made.  
 
 
2.2 Self Deception 
 
The second category of biases is called self deception biases. These biases are also 
forms of failure of rationality, which stems from failure to accurately assess one’s 
internal states. People simply tend to deceive themselves.  
 
Overconfidence bias leads people to believe that their knowledge is more accurate 
than it really is. For example, it has been documented that people tend to assign 
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high probabilities to the events they think will occur, and low probabilities to the 
events they think will not occur. Also, they are too optimistic in assigning 
confidence intervals to the probabilities (e.g. 98% confidence intervals contain the 
true quantity only 60% of the time). Overconfidence is closely connected to the 
overoptimism about an individual’s ability to succeed. 
 
If people are overconfident, it means that they fail more often they expect it. 
Rational learning over time should eliminate overconfidence, which does not 
always happen due to self-attribution bias. People tend to attribute good outcomes 
to their own abilities, and bad outcomes due to external circumstances. Self-
attribution causes individuals to continue to be overconfident rather than converge 
to an accurate self-assessment.  
 
Cognitive dissonance is the mental conflict that people experience when they are 
presented with evidence that their beliefs or assumptions are wrong. It asserts that 
there is a tendency for people to take actions to reduce cognitive dissonance that 
would not normally be considered fully rational: the person may avoid the new 
information or develop contorted arguments to maintain the beliefs or assumptions 
(Shiller, 1999). For example, in one study, it was shown that people after buying a 
car avoided reading advertisements for cars they did not choose, but were attracted 
to advertisements for cars they did choose.  
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Sunk cost effect is a tendency to be excessively attached to activities for which one 
has expended resources. This effect may contribute to the tendency of investors to 
hold on to shares that are losing value for too long. 
 
Similar reasoning can explain hindsight bias, when people think they ‘knew it all 
along’ and the phenomenon of rationalization – constructing a plausible ex post 
rationale for past choices helps an individual feel better about his decision making 
skills.  
 
People tend to interpret ambiguous evidence in such way as to be consistent with 
their own prior beliefs. They give careful scrutiny to inconsistent facts and explain 
them as due to lack or faulty data-gathering. This conformity bias can help maintain 
self-esteem, consistent with self-deception. Exposure to evidence should tend to 
cause rational agents with differing beliefs to converge, whereas the attitudes of 
experimental subjects exposed to mixed evidence tend to become more polarized. 
Confirmatory bias may cause some investors to stick to unsuccessful trading 
strategies, causing mispricing to persist. 
 
 
2.3 Emotions and Self-Control 
 
The third category of biases includes emotions and self-control problems that seem 
to keep people from rational considerations in their utility maximization efforts.  
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Ambiguity aversion causes people to make irrational choices. It may increase risk 
premium over the prediction of CAPM model, when new financial markets are 
introduced, because of the increased uncertainty about the new economic 
environment and about resulting outcomes.  
 
Moods and emotions also affect people’s propensity to risk. For example, sales of 
States of Ohio lottery tickets were found to increase in the days following a football 
victory by Ohio State University. More generally, people who are in good moods 
are more optimistic is their choices and judgments than those in bad moods. 
Feelings affect people’s perceptions of and choices with respect to risk. Bad moods 
are associated with more detailed and critical strategies of evaluating information.  
 
Conformity effect is a tendency to conform to the judgments and behavior of others. 
Related to it, is the false consensus effect – mistaken belief that others share one’s 
belief more than they really do. Self-deception may encourage this phenomenon by 
making the individual reluctant to consider the possibility that he is making an 
error. False consensus may also result from availability (since like-minded people 
tend to associate together). The curse of knowledge is a tendency to think that 
others who are less informed are more similar in their beliefs to the observer than 
they really are.  
 
The fundamental attribution error is the tendency of individuals to underestimate 
the importance of external circumstances and overestimate the importance of 
disposition in determining the behavior of others. In a financial context, such bias 
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might cause observers of a repurchase to conclude that the CEO dislikes holding 
excess cash rather than the CEO is responding to market undervaluation of the 
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3.0 Understanding the Auction Mechanism  
 
3.1 Auction in General 
 
The auction mechanism is gaining acceptance as an effective method of disposal for 
commodities in general and real estate in particular. Recent research tends to focus 
on two main thrusts: comparing revenues from different auction formats to revenues 
from private negotiations (Lusht, 1996; Mayer 1998; Dotzour, Moorhead and 
Winkler, 1998; Allen and Swisher, 2000), and evaluating the probability of a 
positive auction outcome (Maher 1989; DeBoer, Conrad and McNamara, 1992; 
Mayer, 1995; Anglin, 2003; Ong, et al., 2005). 
 
There is no clear consensus on whether prices determined at auctions should be 
higher or lower than that obtained from private searches. Mayer (1995) developed a 
search model with a monopolistic seller to show that a quick sale under the auction 
mechanism results in a poorer “match” between the buyer and the house, thus 
resulting in a discount compared to a private negotiated sale that would allow more 
time for the buyer to search for his ideal home. Empirical work by Mayer (1998) 
using repeat sales to control for quality differences shows that the auction discount 
increases in market downturns. In contrast, using data for 309 single-family 
detached houses offered for sale in the Australian housing market from 1988 to 
1989, Lusht (1996) finds that privately negotiated sales prices are 5.6% less than 
auction prices.  Quan (2002) develops a theoretical model that allowed for 
interaction between multiple sellers and the number of bidders, yielding the result 
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that prices determined at auctions will be higher than private negotiated sales. His 
empirical analysis using data from Texas supports this prediction.  
A second area of research on auctions addresses the probability a unit will sell at 
auction.  Mayer (1995) and Anglin (2003) explicitly focus on changes in market 
conditions and Maher (1989) evaluates the impact of intermediaries on sale 
probability. Ong, et al, (2005) extend prior work by estimating a model that 
includes controls not only for location and structure characteristics, but also 
variables that measure the impact of “turnout” – a proxy for the number of bidders 
at an auction – and the impact of the auctioning house.   Units unsold at auction are 
the subject of studies by Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992), who show that the 
prices for identical units were 13% higher than for units subsequently sold in 
private negotiations. Ong (2005) focuses on properties that were sold through 
private negotiations after unsuccessfully put up for auction.  
 
A final area of research on auctions that is relevant for this paper is the study of 
what causes owners to decide whether to bring units to auction.  Mayer (1995) 
explicitly addresses the role of seller search cost.  Bulow and Klemperer (1996), 
focuses on the seller’s bargaining power. Quan (2002) in contrast, addresses the 
potential buyers, choosing to model their search cost. As Dehring, Dunse, and 
Munneke (2005) demonstrate, this topic is extremely sensitive to the housing 
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3.2 Auction in Singapore 
 
The dominant auction format in Singapore is the English ascending bid auction with 
a secret reserve price. Auctions have generally been regarded as a last resort method 
of disposal. The local sentiment toward auctions is similar to that of the US, where 
auctions are associated with distress properties – foreclosure or mortgagee sales 
(Asabere and Huffman, 1992). Distress sales are typically put up by the mortgagee, 




3.3 Auction Data 
 
The data used in this thesis is the real estate auction sales in Singapore. The sample 
comprises 5,482 private residential auction attempts from 1995Q3 to 2006Q4. This 
period corresponds to an intense run-up in property prices in 1996 and 2006 
followed by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 2003 (SARS) downturn respectively 
in the real estate market. This sample covers almost all residential auctions over that 
period from five auction houses in Singapore. Residential properties in Singapore 
are typically classified into high-rise (apartment and condominium) and low-rise 
(terrace, semi-detached, detached houses). The data set includes variables on the 
                                                 
2 Over the sample period, all public housing flats are financed by mortgages from the Housing 
Development Board (HDB). As a statutory body responsible for providing affordable housing, HDB 
often adopts a benign work-out policy regarding delinquency. Foreigners may own private housing 
only in development is more than 4-storey high. All low-rise housing are hence not available for 
foreign ownership. Expatriates typically rent rather than own. 
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location, date of auction, auctioneer, distress sale versus by-owner sale, type of 
property, tenure, opening price, opening bid and last bid. 
 
 
3.3.1 Understanding the Auction Data 
 
There was a surge in auction sales following the Asian financial crisis.  Although a 
good proportion comprises mortgagee sales, there has been a discernible increase in 
owner auctions.  Local commentators have suggested that this is due to a diminution 
of the stigma associated with auctions.  This is along with a growing perception 
among potential buyers that auctions of distress properties provide a good avenue to 
acquire properties at bargain prices. Buyers and sellers have a better understanding 
and awareness of the efficiency of the auction system as a method of sale, and 
auction companies in Singapore have substantially increased the frequency of 
auctions held each month to meet the growing demand.  Even so, the number of 
properties put up for auction is very low.  As Figure 1 shows, auctions comprised 
5.5% of the total number of property transactions from 1998 to 2006.  
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Bidders in Singapore are generally not aggressive. The success rate for each bidding 
session varies from 10% to 50%.  The low success rate has been attributed to the 
flagging performance of property over this period, rather than the appeal of auctions 
themselves. There may also be a market discovery process at work, where owners 
use the auction process as a gauge of market interest in their properties and some 
buyers withhold from biding during an auction in the hope of securing lower 
transaction prices in post-auction private negotiations. The expectation that private 
negotiations are more likely to secure a sale will also create an incentive for sellers 
to set unrealistically high reserve prices for the auctions.  
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In Singapore reserve prices are disclosed to the auctioneer only on the day of the 
auction itself, and auctioneers have to rely on appraisals and identify interested 
buyers during the open-house viewings prior to the auction. It is important to note 
that the auctioneers and appraisers are two different parties. Since auctioneers only 
know the reserve price for a property literally hours before the auction, they usually 
set a realistic opening bid that would convey useful information to interested 
bidders identified prior to the auction. Auctioneers have anecdotally verified that 
opening bids are usually good indications of the reserve prices. This is particularly 
so over the sample period when the real estate market was “soft”. 
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Loss aversion is proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect 
theory. This is based on the idea that the mental penalty experienced by an 
individual or agent associated with a given loss is greater than the mental reward 
from a gain of the same size. If investors are loss averse, they may be reluctant to 
realize losses.  
 
Hence, unlike the utility function in expected utility theory which is taken to be 
smooth and concave everywhere, the value function in the prospect theory is S-
shaped. It is concave for gains and convex for losses, displaying diminishing 
sensitivity to change in both directions. Furthermore, it has a kink at zero, being 
steeper for small losses than for small gains. 
 
 
The “Anomalies” in Housing Market:  





In this framework, the gains and losses are evaluated relative to some reference 
point.  In Tversky and Kahneman (1991) they highlight three features of an 
individual’s value function that must hold for prospect theory to explain loss 
aversion.  First, the magnitude of all gains and losses are evaluated relative to a 
given reference point, typically assumed to be the acquisition price or an initial 
endowment.  Second, value changes, for given changes in wealth, are asymmetric; 
the value function declines more for a given loss than it rises for a gain of the same 
amount.  Third, for both gains and losses the marginal value of a change in wealth 
declines with the magnitude of the change.   
 
 
4.2 Loss Aversion: “Laboratory”/Experiemental Results 
 
This and other work by Kahneman and Tversky has been subject to considerable 
analysis, especially experimental studies.  The theory and evidence on this class of 
“anomaly” to the neo-classical model of preferences is presented in Kahneman, 
Knestsch, and Thaler (1991).  Experimental work by Knestch (1989) and Bateman, 
et. al (1997) show that individuals are more likely to keep their endowed good than 
engage in a trade for a higher value good.3   One issue that has emerged is the 
difference between the behavior of experienced and inexperienced market 
participants.  Knez, Smith and Williams (1985) and Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 
(1987) argue that the endowment effect phenomenon is just the result of 
                                                 
3 Thaler (1980) presents the term “endowment effect,” but this is functionally equivalent to prospect 
theory.  In our case the endowment will be the reference point for evaluating gains and losses in 
house value. 
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inexperienced market participants, and that as they learn “true” values over time, 
their behavior would come to better resemble neo-classical theory.  Work best 
associated with List (2003, 2004) and in trying to explain myopic loss aversion in 
Haigh and List (2005) demonstrates that loss aversion type behavior diminishes 
with market experience.  However, the results are sensitive to experiment design: 
Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler (2001) find that the endowment effect (loss aversion) 
decline with experience using a Vickrey auction framework vary depending on the 
context of the valuation.   
 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) is one of the very first empirical studies that extended 
the prospect theory to investment. They predict that investors, because of their 
desire to avoid regret, will tend to hold their losing investments too long and sell 
their winners too soon and they labeled this tendency the “disposition effect.” 
 
 
4.3 Housing and Loss Aversion: Literature 
 
Genesove and Mayer (2001) are the very first studies that examine loss aversion in 
real estate market. They argue that owners who are loss-averse have an incentive to 
attenuate the loss by choosing a reservation price that exceeds the level they would 
set in the absence of a loss. Interestingly, empirical evidence further support the loss 
aversion effect in transaction prices, although the sensitively is lower. The loss 
aversion explanation persists in spite of the downpayment / liquidity constraints. 
However, an approach that utilizes listing and transaction prices recognizes that the 
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price is a nonlinear function of property and market characteristics as well as a loss 
variable. In their studies, the loss aversion is defined as the truncated difference 
between the purchase price and the predicted price, recognizing that the computed 
loss variable contains a noise term regarding the over or underpayment when the 
current owner first bought the property, in addition to an error term for unobserved 
quality.  
 
In another study by Englehart (2003), he shows that losses among the most 
leveraged households do not lead to a statistically significant decrease in the 
probability of moving above and beyond the impact of a loss in general. In other 
words, it is the loss rather than the tightening of equity constraints that lowers 
mobility.  
 
Ong, et al., (2004) provide an alternative test of loss aversion explanation for the 
price-volume puzzle. Instead of observing transaction prices, they shifted their 
focus to the more easily observable fact of whether a sale occurred or not. They 
compared the loss aversion sensitivity between foreclosure and non-foreclosure 
sales. They found that foreclosure sales are less sensitive to losses as the financial 
institution’s main concern is to recover the principle outstanding. On the other hand, 
the individual sellers are found to be more reluctant to sell when the losses are high 
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4.4 Housing and Loss Aversion: Why Housing? 
 
Loss aversion is somewhat controversial.  While it is an outcome of prospect 
theory, there has been a challenge to demonstrate it empirically.  Most of the 
research to date relies on experiments.   
 
The housing market is a fruitful place to test loss aversion because it is an 
infrequently traded asset. Unlike common goods such as pens and mugs, a person 
only gets to buy or sell a property few times in their life. Furthermore, housing is 
held for both investment and consumption purposes.  
 
The transaction data allows researchers to identify asset acquisition and disposition 
dates, which has been the challenge for other asset classes.  Unlike equities, housing 
is a search market, so loss aversion behavior will manifest itself through both price 
and time to sale measures.     
 
 
4.5  Research Questions – Loss Aversion 
 
We take loss aversion as a given, and instead focus on what is the relevant 
definition of loss for sellers.  In particular, is it the change in net wealth, the 
potential sales price relative to the purchase price, or is it more the loss of a gain 
they might have achieved, the potential sales price relative to the unit’s peak price 
over the holding period or the more recent past.  Our second objective is to see how 
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loss aversion behavior varies by seller type.  We assume that the Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) result holds in general and look at two sub-sets of sellers: highly 
motivated individual sellers and arms’ length, experienced institutional sellers. 
 
The two specific research questions that we seek to examine in this thesis are:   
(1) What is the relevant reference point for evaluating losses in a prospect 
theory framework?   
(2) How does the sensitivity to loss vary across different types of sellers? 
 
Our data is of a sub-set of sellers in Singapore who put their houses up for auction.  
One of the advantages in using data from Singapore is that we are able to construct 
high quality price indexes for the market, have a set of housing units with much less 
structural variation than is found in North America, and examine behavior over a 
severe market downturn.  The important advantage of using auction data is that it 
allows us to identify a sample of sellers who have self-selected themselves as 
motivated to sell.  Thus we would expect them to be less loss averse than the 
sample of all sellers used in existing studies.  Within the sample we have two 
groups, sales by individuals and by institutions, where the latter are sales of 
foreclosed properties.  This latter distinction allows us to also determine whether 
loss aversion is less likely to occur with more experienced sellers who do not have 
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4.6  Contribution 
 
The first part of the thesis attempts to make two primary contributions to the 
literature. First, we provide empirical evidence on the relevant reference point for 
prospect theory, specifically we examine whether losses are evaluated relative to the 
acquisition prices or the highest possible price the owner could have received over 
the holding period/recent past. 
 
Second, we examine whether there are differences in the extent of loss aversion 
across types of sellers. Genesove and Mayer (2001) compare owner-occupiers and 
investors; we extend this to look at the difference between individual (owners) 
sellers and institutional sellers. Institutional sellers are expected to be less sensitive 
to loss aversion than are individuals, be it they are more experienced or less 
emotionally connected to the unit. Individual sellers, on the other hand, are 
expected to be loss averse.  
 
 
4.7 Data Description 
 
Our sample comprises 5,482 private residential auction attempts from 1995Q3 to 
2006Q4, with missing data from 2001Q2 to 2002Q4. This period corresponds to an 
intense run-up in property prices in 1996 and 2006 followed by the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and 2003 (SARS) downturn respectively in the real estate market. 
Figure 2 shows Singapore house prices with a conventional repeat sales index. This 
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index is constructed using a sample of 28,790 high-rise properties and 8,561 low-
rise properties repeat sales transactions from 1990 to 2008, compiled using SISV 
sales database. 
 
Residential properties in Singapore are typically classified into high-rise (apartment 
and condominium) and low-rise (terrace, semi-detached, detached houses). While 
properties in different locations appear to move together, there are differences by 
type.  Hence, we use property type specific indexes in the analysis. Our period has 
three price peaks and two troughs, allowing for more variation in loss aversion 
across properties than was the case with Genesove and Mayer’s (2001) single 
peaked Boston data.  
 
In Figure 3 we show the distribution of auction attempts.  Most of the auctions 
occurred between mid-1998 and the end of-2006, during the trough of the two 
downturns.   The data set includes variables on the unit location, date of auction, 
auctioneer, sale by individual or foreclosure sale by a financial institution, type of 
property, whether the land title is fee-simple or leased, opening bid and last bid.  
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Figure 2: Singapore House Price Indexes 
 
Figure 3: Auctions Attempts by Year 
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The auction attempt data include a number of properties that were re-auctioned.  
Thus our 5,482 attempts cover 2,715 distinct properties.  557 properties were sold at 
the auction, and of the remaining 2,158 properties, 1967 were subsequently sold 
through private negotiations while 191 remained unsold at the censored date, the 
end of 2008.  The time to sale numbers are quite sensitive to whether a unit is sold 
at the first auction attempt or is right censored in our data.  Figure 4 shows the time 
to sale for units that are sold in the sample period.  The largest mass is for the 3007 
sold at the first auction attempt (days to sale equal to 0).  The distribution drops off 
very quickly from the <100 days cell, but there is a very long tail.  Figure 5 shows 
the distribution of “time on the market” defined as the time between their first 
auction date and the end of our transaction data period in 2008.  For the 191 units 
brought to auction, but not sold, the bulk of the observations are those brought to 
auction between the 3rd quarter of 1995 and the 4th quarter of 1999, giving censored 
“time on the market” values in excess of 10 years.  
 
We estimate time to sale as the number of days from the first-auction attempt until 
sale or the right-censoring date.  These data are quite skewed as the mean number, 
484 days, greatly exceeds the median, 153 days, because of the 191 units that 
remain as unsold, censored units (see Figure 5).  The auctions are concentrated in 
2004, in the price downturn following the 2003 SARs period.  Consequently, the 
auction sales are either by institutions, foreclosed properties, or what we believe to 
sellers motivated to sell because of financial difficulties brought on by the financial 
crisis.  Unfortunately we have no wealth, debt, or income data on the sellers.  
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Figure 4: Number of Days from 1st Auction Date to Date of Sale (Excluding 
properties that remain unsold at censored date) 
Figure 5: Number of Days from 1st Auction Date to Censored Date (Only for  
properties that remain unsold at censored date) 
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Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the 2715 unique properties. Since we 
are interested in the difference in loss aversion behavior in pricing and sales 
strategy based on seller type, we also present descriptive statistics for two sub-
samples (sales by institution and by owners). 
 









Observations 2715 2107 608 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Days from 1st auction date to 
date of unit sale 400 775 317 665 686 1022 
Dummy: =1 if unit is vacant 0.90 0.30 0.92 0.27 0.83 0.38 
Dummy: =1 if title is freehold 0.70 0.46 0.67 0.47 0.80 0.40 
Dummy: =1 if market prices 
have fallen for 2 successive 
quarters 0.76 0.42 0.79 0.40 0.66 0.47 
Price index at auction date 111 8.58 111 7.99 113 10.1 
Price index at eventual sale 112 8.73 111 8.30 114 9.73 
Days from purchase to 1st 
auction date 2261 23.1 2364 25.5 1906 50.9 
Days from highest price over 
holding period to 1st auction 
date 1780 19.6 1915 20.9 1313 44.5 
Days from highest price over  
past 2 years to 1st  auction 
date 577 8.03 607 9.10 475 16.4 
Dummy: =1 if unit is low rise 
structure 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.46 0.50 
Dummy: =1 if unit is being 
sold by institution 
(foreclosure sale) 0.78 0.42 - - - - 
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold at 
auction 0.21 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.08 0.27 
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold at 
1st auction 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.24 
Change in housing price 
index from1st auction to 
eventual sale dates 0.01 0.05 0.004 0.04 0.01 0.07 
Loss aversion (relative to 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 
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price index at purchase date) 
Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over 
holding period) 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.08 
Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over 2 
years prior to sale) 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Notes: Loss aversion is censored at zero for those units for whom the price index at 
time of sale or censoring is greater than the value at the reference point.  We then 
use the absolute value of the loss.   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by Auction Attempt (5482 Observations) 
 Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold at auction 0.10 0.30 0 1.00 
Dummy: =1 if unit is vacant 0.93 0.25 0 1.00 
Dummy: =1 if title is freehold 0.69 0.46 0 1.00 
# of previous auction attempts 1.42 2.41 0 25.00 
Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen for 2 
successive quarters 0.82 0.39 0 1.00 
Price index at auction date 110 7.79 97.2 140 
Days from purchase to 1st auction date 2341 1168 21.0 5937 
Days from highest price over holding period to 
1st auction date 1900 969 0 3879 
Days from highest price over past 2 years to 1st 
auction date 596 399 0 3878 
Dummy: =1 if unit is low rise structure 0.33 0.47 0 1.00 
Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by institution 
(foreclosure sale) 0.85 0.36 0 1.00 
Loss aversion (relative to price index at 
purchase date) 0.09 0.07 0 0.22 
Loss aversion (relative to highest price index 
over holding period) 0.16 0.07 0 0.31 
Loss aversion (relative to highest price index 
over 2 years prior to sale) 0.05 0.05 0 0.29 
 
 
The properties put up for auction are mostly vacant, constituting 90% of the total 
observations. Freehold properties make up the bulk of the sample. High rise 
properties make up the majority of the auction attempts. Approximately 75 percent 
of the properties are offered for sale by institutions, but they constitute 85 percent of 
the auction attempts as they are more likely to attempt to auction again if the first 
attempt ended in failure.   
 
The state of the market variable suggests that 76% of properties were first put up for 
auction during a down market. The average holding period from purchase to first 
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auction attempt is about 2261 days.  Only 14 percent of the properties are sold at 
first auction. 
 
On the average, owners suffered a 9% loss from their original purchase price and 
15% from the highest peak observed during their holding period. If we take the 
most recent losses (past 2 years prior to sale), owners suffered an average loss of 
5%. The highest loss is about 31% over the holding period and 29% over the 2 
years prior to sale.   
 
In Table 1 we also compare properties put up for auction by institutions with those 
offered by individual owners. For nearly all of the variables the differences in the 
means are statistically different from zero.  The differences are greatest in 
magnitude for the days from first auction date to sale, principally because of the 
large difference in the probability that a unit is sold at auction. On average, 
institutions sell their units in 317 days to sell their properties, while it takes 686 
days for individual owners. This provides some anecdotal evidence of difference in 
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Prospect theory suggests that when faced with choices involving simple two and 
three outcome lotteries, people behave as if maximizing an S-shaped value function. 
Hence critical to this value function is the reference point from which gains and 
losses are measured. As Kahneman and Tversky (pp, 286 – 287) put it, “In most 
cases, the status quo is taken as the reference point, but there are situations in which 
gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs 
from the status quo.” The reference point used for the past studies of loss aversion 
using housing market data is the purchase value. Given that property is usually held 
for a long time over a wide range of prices, the purchase date may be only one 
determinant of the reference point. The price path may also affect the level of the 
reference point.  For measuring the magnitude of loss aversion we use the change in 
the market price index.  Our defense of this approach is presented in Appendix A. 
 
This study uses three reference points – price at purchase, the peak property price 
over the owner’s holding period and the peak property price over the recent past, 
which we define as the past two years. To take account of the same market peak 
that we observed for part of our samples, the loss aversion relative to the highest 
price over the holding period is measured as a function of purchase value, that is, it 




pricehighest  .  In addition, we examine the reaction 
of the owners to the most recent losses.  The purchase date in our sample is traced 
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using the Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers (SISV) sales database, 
which encompasses all residential real estate transactions in Singapore since 1988.   
 
We use three approaches to measure the effect of loss aversion on auction sales. 
First we test for the effect of loss aversion on a unit’s sales price, either the price 
that the properties are sold either at the auction itself or via private negotiated sales 
after failure to sell at the auction. We recognize that there may be a sample selection 
issue in that we are focusing on properties that are put up for auction, as well as 
those that sell. We applied a Heckman correction for sample selection.  However, 
the coefficients on the inverse mills ratio in the 2nd stage OLS regressions on sales 
price and time to sale were consistently statistically not different from zero, so we 
reject any problems of bias.4  In this and the subsequent two tests we control for 
seller type and introduce an interaction between seller type and the measures of loss 
aversion to see if there is any evidence of variation in sensitivity to loss across seller 
types.   
 
Housing markets clear via both price adjustment and time on the market.  Our 
second approach is to test for an effect of our different loss aversion measures on 
the number of days from the first auction where the property has been put up for 
auction to the point where it is sold, either at the auction itself or via private 
                                                 
4 We used Lee’s (1982) 2-stage procedure by estimating a first stage probit regression on a data set 
of 13,225 properties, of which 12,408 properties that are sold via private negotiated sales (does not 
include those that are sold via private negotiated sales after failure to sell at the auction). Variables 
included in the probit model are dummies for low rise and freehold properties, year and 
neighborhood (postal code) dummies, floor area, volume of sales in that quarter and change in price 
relative to purchase date.  
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negotiated sales. This is similar to the research on time on market and we 
hypothesize that owners who are loss averse should have a higher reserve prices and 
be less likely to sell their properties if they were to incur a loss, hence their units 
should remain a longer time on the market. We employ a proportional hazard model 
of duration for this test. Our third approach takes advantage of our auction data to 
test a variant of the probability of sale analysis, whether a unit is sold at auction or 
not.  Since most successful auction sales occur at the first auction this is analogous 
to testing whether time to sale equals zero.   
 
To control for market condition, we specify a state-of-the-market variable that 
indirectly affects the sentiment of property buyers and hence affects the probability 
of a sale (Mayer, 1995).  The state-of-the-market variable is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of zero if the auction occurred in a quarter following two previous 
successive quarters of negative growth in property prices. We also introduce year 
dummy variables to control for the timing of the auction (Vanderporten, 1992) and 
the absolute value of the property price index that we observed at the auction date.  
We include a number of property characteristic variables: title type (freehold or 
leasehold), whether the unit is currently vacant, is the property in a high rise or low 
rise property (terrace (townhouse), or detached unit), and property size, either floor 
or lot area or both.  To capture neighborhood amenities we include postal area fixed 
effects (twenty eight separate districts).  We also capture the number of previous 
auction attempts to account for repeat auctions.  
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A central element of our analysis is whether loss aversion varies across individuals.  
This may be because of market experience, as suggested by theoretical work or 
some other factor.  We distinguish between experienced trades, those sales 
conducted by institutions, and sales by an individual owner.  We expect the 
individuals responsible for selling the units on behalf of the financial institutions to 
have more experience with the market than will individuals selling their own units.  
However, because sales by financial institutions are typically foreclosure sales, the 
institutions may only be concerned about the value of their outstanding loan, the 
appropriate reference point maybe the loan’s current value.  The institutional setting 
suggest otherwise.  Borrowers in Singapore are liable for negative equity in the 
event of mortgage default.5 Consequently, lenders owe a fiduciary duty to obtain the 
best price for defaulted owners.6  This is in addition to the incentive to cover 
outstanding loan principals. Given that institutional sellers have similar incentives 
as owner-sellers to obtain the best price possible, any empirical differences in loss 
aversion behavior between institutions and owners may be attributed to experience 
or proclivity to loss aversion. 
 
Other control variables that are used are the number of days from either the 
purchase or highest property price index (PPI) value observed during the holding 
period to date of first, change in PPI from first auction to eventual sale, number of 
                                                 
5 More precisely, negative equity for Singapore mortgages occurs when the sale proceeds net of 
repayment of the CPF principal sum plus CPF savings used to pay the legal costs, stamp duty and 
survey fees is less than the loan principal (CPF Residential Property Scheme). This policy has been 
amended since September 2002. 
6 Owners who perceive that their properties are sold at lower than market prices can and do file legal 
suits against the bank. For this reason, many banks have to show due diligence in trying to get the 
best price possible. 
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days from date of first auction to censored date and also a dummy variable to 




Our first test is whether owners exposed to nominal losses in their properties hold 
out for higher transactions prices.  As per the treatment in Genesove and Mayer 
(2001), all else being equal, if loss aversion is present, the eventual sales price 
should rise with the loss exposure (positive coefficient on the loss aversion 
measure), but the marginal effect should decline with the size of the loss (negative 
coefficient on the square of the loss aversion measure). We present the results in 
Table 3A and 3B. These are separate for high and low rise units.   The need to 
exclude units that do not transact in the observation period restricts the total sample 
size to 2520 observations.  As noted above, loss aversion is measured as the change 
in the overall market index between three separate reference point date and the sales 
date. We see evidence of loss aversion behavior around sales price for both high 
and low rise units.  For all units, it is clear that the choice of reference point 
matters.7 
 
In our data, loss aversion does not affect sales prices when the reference point is the 
initial purchase price.  Regressions (1) and (4) use the change in the market price 
index between the unit’s purchase and sales dates to measure loss aversion for high 
                                                 
7 These regressions include year and neighborhood (postal area) dummies; unit characteristics such 
as whether the unit is vacant, title is freehold, unit size (high-rise only), and lot size (low rise only); 
and auction variable is # of previous auction attempts.  Results on property type and size are sensible 
and robust across specifications within a type class  
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and low rise units respectively.  In both cases, the standard errors of coefficient 
estimates exceed the point estimates.  Sellers appear to be more sensitive to forgone 
wealth opportunities than an actual loss.  Sales prices for all unit types rise with loss 
aversion when the reference point to measure this loss is the highest possible value 
achievable over the whole period and over the last 2 years prior to sale.  In 
regressions (2), (3), (5) and (6), for both high- and low-rise units, when the 
reference point is the highest achievable price over the whole period and the last 2 
years prior to sale, the coefficient estimates on loss aversion are of the expected 
signs and either statistically different than zero at the 10 percent level or close to 
this criteria.  The statistically significant negative coefficients in regressions (5) and 
(6) on the square of the loss aversion measure is consistent with prospect theory 
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Table 3A: Regressions on Log Sales Price (High Rise) 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen for 























Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 



















Change in housing price index from1st 















Over Last 2 
Years






























Number of Observations 1632 1632 1632 
R-Squared 0.54 0.53 0.53 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies; hedonic variables include whether unit is vacant, title is 
freehold, unit size (high-rise only), and lot size (low rise only); and auction variable 
is # of previous auction attempts but are not in the table.    
 
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table 3B: Regressions on Log Sales Price (Low Rise)  
 (4) (5) (6)  







Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen for 























Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 



















Change in housing price index from1st 















Over Last 2 
Years






























Number of Observations 888 888 888 
R-Squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies; hedonic variables include whether unit is vacant, title is 
freehold, unit size (high-rise only), and lot size (low rise only); and auction variable 
is # of previous auction attempts but are not in the table.    
 
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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In general, institutions are selling units at a lower price. However, this result is only 
statistically different from zero for high-rise units in regressions (1) to (3).  The 
prices at which institutions sell units appear to be somewhat less affected by losses 
than is the case for individual owners: the coefficients on the interaction between 
loss aversion and sold by institution are negative in all the six regressions and the 
point estimates are statistically different from zero in regressions (5) and (6).   
 
In Table 4A & 4B we present results for the test of the relationship between loss 
aversion and time to sale.  The empirical specification uses a proportional hazard 
model, so that the coefficients reflect the hazard of sale, rather than days to sale. 
Thus a positive coefficient means the probability of sale, contigent upon not having 
sold to date, increases in the variable.  This is analogous to a decrease in the 
expected time to sale.  There is right censoring in the data for the 191 of our 2715 
units that do not sell in the sample period, which closes in Dec. 2008.  Genesove 
and Mayer (2001) were the first to identify the expect effects of loss aversion on 
sales time in search markets such as housing. We find support for Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) in regressions (2) and (3) where the loss aversion is measured relative 
to both the highest price and highest price over the recent past. This result is 
statistically different than zero at the 5 percent level. For the purchase point of 
reference, the coefficient is also negative, but with smaller point estimates.  
 
Institutions tend to sell units more quickly as observed in regressions (1), (2) and 
(3) where the coefficients on sale by institutions are statistically significant.  The 
results also indicate that they are less affected by loss aversion than are individual 
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sellers. Relative to individuals, increases in the perceived loss increase the sale 
hazard (accelerate the time to sale) for institutions relative to the hazard for units 
sold by individuals: the coefficient on the loss aversion by institution interaction 
variable is negative and statistically different than zero in regressions (2) and (3).  
However, institutions themselves do not display explicit loss aversion behavior.  
When the sample is limited to sales by institutions in regression (4) and (5); the 
coefficient on potential loss is far from statistically different than zero.   
 
One interesting point from Tables 3A & 3B and 4A & 4B is that institutions tend to 
sell at a faster pace as compared to owners when faced with losses, but they do not 
necessarily sell at a lower price than the owners. In other words, institutions wanted 
to recoup their losses at the soonest possible but still appear to sell at the highest 
price achievable. This result is supportive of the claim that financial institutions 
follow their fiduciary duty to exercise care in trying to obtain the best price possible 
for defaulted properties.  
 
In Table 5A & 5B we look at a variant of the time to sale questions, by examining 
the role loss aversion may play in influencing whether a property sells at the first 
attempted auction or not.8  Sale at auction is a likely explanation for the shorter 
mean selling times for units sold by institutions, as those units sold at first auction 
comprise a mass at zero in the time to sale data.  Whether a unit is sold at auction 
depends both on interest in the property and on the opening minimum bid set by 
auctioneer.  We presume the latter reflects the reservation price set by the seller as 
                                                 
8 This follows work by Ong, Lusht, and Mak (2005) on this question.   
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the auctioneer learns of the seller’s reservation price on the day of the auction.  
Consistent with the treatment in the sale hazard model in Table 4A & 4B, we expect 
that the probability of a unit being sold at auction falls with loss aversion, reflecting 
the higher reservation prices associated with loss aversion.  This expectation is 
confirmed in regressions (2) and (3) where the coefficient on loss aversion is 
negative and statistically significant, reflecting a lower probability of sale at 
auction.  Here again we find that the relevant reference point is not the purchase 
price, but the highest price achieved since purchase, or in the past two years.  
 
We also find evidence that the probability a financial institution sells a unit at 
auction increases with the perceived loss.  Though the coefficient estimates for 
institutions (the interaction effect) are not statistically different from zero in 
regressions (1), (2) and (3), when we limit the sample to sales by institutions in 
regressions (5) and (6), the coefficient estimate for loss aversion in regression (5) is 
positive and statistically different from zero. 
 
To conclude, our results suggest that loss aversion is evident. Probably our most 
robust result is that the relevant reference point for measuring the change in the 
value function is not the initial nominal purchase price, but rather the highest value. 
There are strong evidences for the reference points to be both the highest price and 
highest price over the most recent past.  Our other findings include that institutions 
are less susceptible to loss aversion than individuals.  Both prices and time to sale 
time to sale increase more for individuals than for institutions as the likely loss 
increases.  Like Genesove and Mayer (2001) we get a clear positive relationship 
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between potential loss and the time to sale, where we measure this in a duration 
framework as the hazard for the probability of sale.  We also find that loss aversion 
is not present for all sellers in housing markets.  Sellers, self-selected to be 
motivated sellers do not hold out for higher prices.  However, they do take longer to 
sell their units.  A more robust finding is that experienced sellers, in our data 
institutions selling foreclosed units, are less affected as loss aversion increases in 
their time to sale and likelihood of sale at auction than are individuals. 
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Table 4A: Time to Sale – All Sales 
(Proportional Hazard Model)  
 (1)   (2) (3) 
 All Sales 








































Change in housing price index from 1st auction to 






















Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to purchase 




Loss aversion (relative to highest price index over 




Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to highest 





Loss aversion (relative to highest price index over 
2 years prior to sale)   
-8.08***
(2.74) 
Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to highest 
price index over 2 years prior to sale) x sold by 
institution   
8.92*** 
(1.92) 
Number of observations 2715 2715 2715 
Likelihood ratio -3293 -3290 -3283
Dependent Variable: Number of Days from 1st Auction to Eventual Sale Either by 
Auction or Private Negotiated Sale.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the 
models include year and neighborhood (postal area) dummies.  Other variables 
included in the regression, but not shown here is the interaction between loss 
aversion and low rise and dummy for unit is not occupied.  
 ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4B: Time to Sale – Institutional Sales Only 
(Proportional Hazard Model)  
 (4)  (5)  
 Institution Sales 
Only 






Price index at auction date   








Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by institution (foreclosure 
sale)   




Change in housing price index from 1st auction to eventual 
sale dates  
14.0*** 
(2.34) 







Loss aversion (relative to price index at purchase date)   
Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to purchase price) x 
sold by institution   




Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to highest price index 
over holding period) x sold by institution   
Loss aversion (relative to highest price index over 2 years 
prior to sale)  
0.94 
(2.18) 
Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to highest price index 
over 2 years prior to sale) x sold by institution   
Number of observations 2107 2107 
Likelihood ratio -2612 -2589 
Dependent Variable: Number of Days from 1st Auction to Eventual Sale Either by 
Auction or Private Negotiated Sale.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the 
models include year and neighborhood (postal area) dummies.  Other variables 
included in the regression, but not shown here is the interaction between loss 
aversion and low rise and dummy for unit is not occupied.  
 
 ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5A: Probability Property Will Be Sold at Auction – All 
Sample (Logit for All Auction Attempts)  
 (1) (2) (3) 



















Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen 













Days from purchase to 1st auction date 0.0002*** 
(0.0001)  
 
Days from highest price over holding 




Days from highest price over past 2 years 
prior to sale to 1st auction date   
0.0002 
(0.0001) 






Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 
























Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 




Loss aversion (relative to highest price 




Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over holding period) x 




Loss aversion (relative to highest price 
index over past 2 years prior to sale)   
-1.07*** 
(3.61) 
Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over past 2 years prior 
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Number of observations 5482 5482 5482 
Log likelihood -1498 -1499 -1502 
    
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable of value = 1 if property is sold at auction and 
0 else 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies.  Other variables included in the regression, but not shown 
here is interaction between loss aversion and low rise and dummy if unit is vacant.  
 
 ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5B: Probability Property Will Be Sold at Auction – 
Institutional Sales Only (Logit for All Auction Attempts) 
 (4) (5) (6) 



















Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen 













Days from purchase to 1st auction date 0.0001*** 
(0.0001)  
 
Days from highest price over holding 




Days from highest price over past 2 years 
prior to sale to 1st auction date   
0.0002 
(0.0001) 






Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 
institution (foreclosure sale)  
  
 
















Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
purchase price) x sold by institution  
  
Loss aversion (relative to highest price 




Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over holding period) x 
sold by institution   
 
Loss aversion (relative to highest price 
index over past 2 years prior to sale)   
0.62 
(2.89) 
Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over past 2 years prior 
to sale) x sold by institution   
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Number of observations 4652 4652 4652 
Log likelihood -1323 -1322 -1325 
    
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable of value = 1 if property is sold at auction and 
0 else 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies.  Other variables included in the regression, but not shown 
here is interaction between loss aversion and low rise and dummy if unit is vacant.  
 
 ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Interest in auctions by economists has led to an entire sub-field of economics on 
auction theory.  Most impressively, the theoretical findings in this area provide 
considerable practical guidance into auction construction and design.  Housing is a 
fruitful area for empirical analysis of auction theory because houses are sold both 
by auction and negotiated sales.  To date research has had a narrower objective of 
testing whether auction sales occur at a premium or discount.  Answering the 
question whether houses sold at auction sell at a discount or premium has turned out 
to be surprisingly difficult.  In some countries auction sales are unusual, raising 
concerns about left out variable bias in the estimation.  Where they are more 
common, the decision to sell a house by auction is unlikely to be random, yielding 
selection bias.   
 
In this paper we use auction data from Singapore that allows us to address aspects 
of excluded variable bias that is likely to be more prevalent in other studies of 
auction sales. As well, the mix of private transactions, auction sales, and foreclosure 
sales also enables us to identify the extent to which under-maintenance, asymmetric 
information, or bargaining power cause housing units sold because of foreclosure to 
transact at a discount. We also add an additional area of exploration, the role of 
auctions in price discovery. We examine whether there is any price anomaly for 
units that are not sold at non-pooled auction but subsequently sold through private 
The “Anomalies” in Housing Market:  





negotiation. A price anomaly might suggest that the experience that bidders gained 
at the auction matters, hence leading to a price difference as compared to those who 
put up their sales directly through private negotiation.  
 
Our contribution to the literature is three fold. First, with our auction data and 
ability to distinguish between institution and owner sale, we are able to provide a 
clearer understanding on the interaction between the winner’s curse associated with 
auction and the well documented finding on discount for foreclosed properties. 
Second, unlike auctions in US markets which are often associated with distressed 
properties, our auction data allows us to examine the differences in the extent of 
price premium/discount across two main types of sellers, essentially institution 
sellers of defaulted properties and owner-sellers who view auctions as an alternative 
sale mechanism. Third, by using condominium properties with building fixed 
effects we are not only able to control more effectively for unobserved variables, 
but also critically control for problems with under-maintenance and asymmetric 
information on unit quality in looking at foreclosure sales.   
 
Our findings are quite intriguing.  First, we find evidence of a price discount for 
auction sales, although the effect is only significant for high rise properties.  
However, if a unit is sold subsequent to the auction by private sale, it sells at a 
slight discount of 3 to 5 percent.  It is not apparent that this could be due to an 
adverse price discovery process or that these properties are inferior or that the 
reserve price is too high. A higher discount is noted when the property that is 
subsequently sold is a foreclosed property. 
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Our results show quite clearly, that if one effectively controls for under-
maintenance and asymmetric information concerns about unit quality for 
foreclosure sales, there is no foreclosure discount. In fact, foreclosed high rise 
properties (that are less prone to under-maintenance and asymmetric information) 
sell at a 3 percent price premium.   
 
The next section provides some institutional information about auctions in 
Singapore. A description of the auction data, as well as market sale transactions is 
provided in the following section. This section also addresses the issue of index 
 
The paper follows the standard structure.  We follow a review of the literature with 
a discussion of auctions in Singapore and other details about the data.  This is 






Auctioned properties may sell at a discount or premium to private negotiated sale. 
Surprisingly, there is no clear consensus on whether prices determined at auctions 
should be higher or lower than that obtained from private searches, both in 
theoretical and empirical research.  A well known phenomenon of auctions is the 
winner’s curse, where under certain assumptions successful bidders pay more than 
an item’s expected market value.  Mayer (1995) develops a theoretical search model 
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with a monopolistic seller to show that a quick sale under the auction mechanism 
results in a poorer “match” between the buyer and the house. Consequently, the 
auction sale price would typically be at a discount compared to a private negotiated 
sale.  In contrast, Quan (2002) develops a theoretical model that allowed for 
interaction between multiple sellers and the number of bidders where participants 
can choose between auction and negotiated sales.  In this model there is a separating 
equilibrium between the two sales approaches based on seller and buyer discount 
rates and expected search times.  Auction prices are higher because of reduced sales 
times. 
 
The literature on housing auctions has not yielded a clear answer as to the sign and 
magnitude of an auction price effect.  Work with US data (Mayer 1998, Allen and 
Swisher 2000, Quan 2002) finds that houses sold at auction are sold at a discount, 
while Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) find a premium for auction sales in the US.9  
A key difference between the latter two papers, is that Quan sees this premium as 
compensation for benefits of seller reduced search costs in an auction and 
Ashenfelter and Genesove interpret their finding as evidence of the “winner’s 
curse.”  In Australia, where auctions are quite a common sales mechanism, Lusht 
(1996) finds houses sold through privately negotiated sales had a 5.6 percent 
discount to houses sold at auction. Auctions are also an important sales mechanism 
in Scotland.  Using Scottish data and modeling the first stage decision as to whether 
                                                 
9 Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) find a price premium relative for auction sales to buyers of units 
at the same New Jersey condominium complexes in later private negotiated sales for units whose 
sale at the auction fell through, leading to a subsequent negotiated sale..  However, the auction 
winners both get the units earlier, obtain units with certainty, but also win the “right to choose”.  
Quan suggests his result, which is contrary to his theoretical model, reflect sample selection bias in 
the decision to sell via auction.   
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to use the auction or private sales framework, Dehring, Dunse and Munneke (2005) 
do not detect significant price effect between the two alternative systems, although 
they find evidence of sample selection as in Lusht (1996).10    
 
The problem in reaching any conclusions from this work is that we might believe in 
the US auctioned properties carry the stigma of being foreclosure sales or associated 
with them, while elsewhere, the first stage sample selection decision must be 
modeled. A precise comparison of the sales prices of auctioned and non-auctioned 
properties requires the measurement of a set of typically unobservable seller and 
unit characteristics. For distressed properties, unit quality, buyer risk assessment, 
and seller bargaining position. For units with accepted side by side auction and 
private sales mechanisms, the set of seller specific preferences and unobserved unit 
characteristics that cause a seller to select one or the other sales mechanism.   
 
One approach for US auction data might be to back out the pure foreclosure effect 
from the aggregate auction effect.  This would require a data set that included 
auction, foreclosed, and regular sales.  Most studies document a discount for 
foreclosed properties (Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans, 1990; Forgey, Rutherford 
and VanBuskirk, 1994; Hardin and Wolverton, 1996, Pennington-Cross, 2006)11.  
Two key reasons are offered for the discount. First, foreclosure sales are by 
definition defaulted loans and sellers are more likely to have negative equity 
                                                 
10 Stevenson & Young (2004) find that the sales price for auctioned properties in Dublin, Ireland is 
statistically significantly higher greater than the advertised guide price for the property, which is not 
true for private treaty sale prices. This is consistent with, but not evidence of, a premium for auction 
sales, depending on the listing price strategies in the two markets. 
11 The Carroll, Clauretie and Neill (1997) analysis of HUD foreclosure sales is an exception. 
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resulting from larger relative price declines or because of cash flow problems the 
units may have not had have and under average maintenance. Even if the latter is 
not true, asymmetric information will price such a discount into a buyer’s offer.  
Second, sellers of foreclosed properties by definition are motivated sellers who 
either have a lower reservation price or have a weaker bargaining power and 
consequently are willing to accept lower prices.  
 
The one surprisingly observation that emerges is that the two bodies of knowledge 
are developed almost independently, even though in the US, and thus for these 
papers, foreclosed properties are sold via auction or private sale (Pennington-Cross, 
2006)12.  Earlier foreclosure research such as Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans 
(1990) and Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994) use MLS transactions of 
foreclosure properties. Hardin and Wolverton (1996) are silent on the sale 
mechanism for their foreclosure sales. Carroll, et al. (1995) examine HUD 
foreclosure sales, but it is not clear if these are through auctions. Given that 
foreclosed properties are expected to sell at a discount and that auctioned properties 
could sell at a premium, it remains a largely unanswered question as to whether it is 
better to sell foreclosed properties via the auction mechanism. This question is 
pertinent to foreclosing institutions as well as defaulted owners.  
 
Allen and Swisher (2000) is a notable exception. They find that foreclosed 
properties sold through a HUD auction were sold at a discount. Curiously, the size 
                                                 
12 Pennington-Cross (2006) notes that “… even within judicial states, the method by which the 
[foreclosed] property is sold varies…the property could be sold at a public auction, … or attorney 
sale, court appointed referee sales. Typical power-of-sale foreclosure sale include auction sales or 
trustee sales.” (page 200) 
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of the discount for the 160 foreclosed properties sold via auction over two days 
declines with the order of sale. It is possible that their finding is a result of the 





This study utilizes auction data from Singapore from 1995 to 2006.  These 
auctioned properties are a mix of foreclosed properties put up for sale by 
institutions and non-foreclosed properties put up for sale by owners. We take 
advantage of this difference to determine the existence of a foreclosure effect for 
auctioned properties.  As well, because the auctions occur over a long time period, 
in contrast to most existing work, we can test for the stability of any auction or 
foreclosure effect and its relationship to market conditions.   
 
A key feature of this work is the control group of properties not sold though 
auctions.  For units in high-rise condominium buildings we use sales from other 
units in the same structure, effectively using a building fixed effect.  For units with 
individual title, principally attached units (low-rise), we use other sales in the same 
postal district, generating 28 neighborhood fixed effects. 
 
An aspect of foreclosure sales that is important is the seller’s motivation.  Does 
foreclosing mortgagee (lender) have an incentive to achieve the market price?  In 
Singapore, foreclosing institutions (typically banks) have a duty of good faith to 
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obtain the market price.  This is not as strong as a fiduciary duty, so that the 
mortgagee is generally entitled to prefer his own interest (e.g. he may sell at the 
time he considers right) so long as he does not disregard the mortgagor's interests.  
Borrowers in Singapore are liable for negative equity in the event of mortgage 
default.13 Consequently, the mortgagee is liable to legal action if a foreclosed 
property is sold at below market price, causing loss to the mortgagor.  In Singapore, 
selling institutions have favored the auction mechanism as it insulates them from 
legal action by demonstrating that due process has been undertaken to obtain a fair 
price (Ong, 2006).  
 
Figure 6 shows the pattern of auction attempts in Singapore.  There was a surge in 










                                                 
13 In Singapore, negative equity  occurs when the sale proceeds net of repayment of the CPF 
principal sum plus CPF savings used to pay the legal costs, stamp duty and survey fees is less than 
the loan principal (CPF Residential Property Scheme). This policy has been amended since 
September 2002. 
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Figure 6: Auctions Attempts by Year 
 
 
* 1Q00 only includes data on one month of the quarter 
 
In this paper’s current form, we apply a simple hedonic test, comparing sales prices 
for our units of interest with comparable units not sold via auction or by 
foreclosure.  We define comparable units as follows: for high-rise units, other units 
sold in the same building or development, for low-rise units, other units sold in the 
same postal code. Among the high-rise properties, 326 properties are sold at the 
auction itself, 1,216 are sold through private negotiation after failure to sell at the 
auction, with 74,596 transactions of units in the same buildings not sold through 
auction.  For low-rise buildings, 204 low-rise properties are sold at auctions, 673 
sold through private negotiations after failure to sell at auction, and 221,480 are 
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through private sales without attempting an auction.14  For both cases, the matching 
units are limited to transactions within 18 months15 prior or after the sale date of the 
units brought to auction. 
 
We treat high-rise and low-rise properties separately to accommodate for the 
differences in explanatory variables and to adjust for heteroskedasticity.  In both 
cases are explanatory variable list for the hedonic specification is quite small, floor 
area for the high-rise units, and lot-area for the low-rise units.  Because we use 
building fixed effects, problems with left out variable bias should not be a problem 
for the high rise units, as controlling for unit size; unit quality will be quite 
homogenous within a given building.  We recognize that with the low-rise units this 
is problematic.  We present the results for the low-rise units as a comparison to the 
high-rise units, rather than a source of conclusive evidence on their own.   
 
Tables 6A & 6B provide the summary statistics for the high- and low-rise properties 
used in the price regressions. The mean sale price is $5,370 per square meter of 
floor area for the high-rise units and $5,01216 per square meter of lot area for the 
low rise properties. The average floor size for high-rise properties is 127 square 
meters and the mean lot size for low-rise properties is 358 square meters. 
Approximately one third of the high rise properties have a freehold tenure while 
low rise properties with freehold tenure constitute about 84% of the sample. 5% of 
                                                 
14 There are many more low-rise sales, even though high-rise is the dominant form of structure in 
Singapore because the martching geography, one of the 14 postal districts in Singapore, is much 
larger than the criteria for the high-rise units, that they be in the same building.   
15 Various windows from 12 to 24 months were tried and 18 months was chosen as it gives a 
sufficient number of sample size for its comparables 
16 The figures shown are in Singapore dollars. US$1 = S$1.45 
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the high rise properties are newly built while 15% of the low rise properties are 
new. 
 
Table 6A: Descriptive Statistics for Regressions on Log Sale Price – High Rise 
 
 High Rise 












 Mean Std Dev Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Sale Price (Log) 3.73 0.16 3.71 0.18 
Dummy: =1 if unit is put up at an auction 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.40 
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold at auction 0.004 0.07 0.04 0.21 
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold via PNS after 
failure to sell at auction 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.37 
Unit floor area (m2) 126.89 52.03 131.90 75.68 
Lot area (m2)     
Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by institution 
(foreclosure sale) 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.37 
Dummy: =1 if it has a freehold tenure 0.31 0.46 0.37 0.48 
Dummy: =1 if the unit is new 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 
State of market 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.49 
     
Number of Observations 76,148 1,558 
     
All the models include year, property price index at the date of sale 
 
+++ Comparables selected based on 18 months from the date of sale and/or 
subsequent sale 
 
Our data includes also year, property price index at the date of sale neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies (low rise) and development dummies (high rise). 
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Table 6B: Descriptive Statistics for Regressions on Log Sale Price – Low Rise 
 
 Low Rise 














 Mean Std Dev Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Sale Price (Log) 3.70 0.15 3.68 0.16
Dummy: =1 if unit is put up at an auction 0.004 0.06 0.07 0.25
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold at auction 0.001 0.03 0.02 0.13
Dummy: =1 if unit is sold via PNS after 
failure to sell at auction 0.003 0.05 0.05 0.22
Unit floor area (m2)  
Lot area (m2) 358.06 441.64 515.95 732
Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by institution 
(foreclosure sale) 0.003 0.05 0.04 0.22
Dummy: =1 if it has a freehold tenure 0.84 0.36 0.88 0.32
Dummy: =1 if the unit is new 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32
State of market 0.66 0.47 0.67 0.47
  
Number of Observations 222,362 3,819 
     
All the models include year, property price index at the date of sale 
 
+++ Comparables selected based on 18 months from the date of sale and/or 
subsequent sale 
 
Our data includes also year, property price index at the date of sale neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies (low rise) and development dummies (high rise). 
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Repeat Sales Fourier Approach
We use a market price index to control for the state of the market.  To do so we 
construct a traditional repeat sales price index as the readily available Urban 
Redevelopment Authority of Singapore (URA) price index does not control for 
house quality.17 Figure 8 is the property price indexes for high and low rise 
properties. 
 




We recognize that there may be a sample selection process by which sellers decide 
whether to bring a property to market or not.  A theoretical framework for this 
process is laid out in Quan (2002) and it is formally incorporated into models by 
                                                 
17 The repeat sales price index is calculated from 69,211 high-rise property repeat sales transaction 
pairs and 13,476 low-rise properties repeat sales transactions, both from 1989 to 2006, compiled 
using the Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers (SISV) sales database. 
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Lusht (1996) and Dehring, Dunse and Munneke (2005).  We choose not to do so for 
several reasons.  First, auctions represent such a low percentage of total transactions 
in Singapore that is hard to believe that any more than a small number of non-
institutional sellers engage in a systematic choice between the two options.  Second, 
the decision depends on both the unit and the owner.  However, we have no 
variables describing the owner and the owner’s wealth and cash flow positions, so 
that like Lusht, our identification in a first stage probit would derive entirely from 
the non-linear treatment of structure and location characteristics in this first stage, 
as opposed to a linear treatment in the second stage price equation.  We do not find 
this to be consistent with a true selection process, where this is a measurable 
underlying systematic selection process at work.18  
 
We use an alternative approach as a robustness test. In this approach, we use repeat 
sales sample. For the 2,419 properties that were sold either at auction or through 
private negotiation after failure to sell at auction,  we traced their subsequent resale, 
if any, using the Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers (SISV) sales 
database, which encompasses virtually all residential real estate transactions in 
Singapore since 1988. We have 567 properties with subsequent sale, of which 318 
are high rise properties. Figure 9 shows the holding period from the sale at 
auction/private negotiation after failure to sell at auction to its subsequent resale. 
The largest mass is for the 172 properties sold in the first year after its first sale at 
                                                 
18 We did as an experiment use a two stage process with a probit and an inverse Mills ratio.  This did 
not have a meaningful effect on our parameter estimates.   
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auction/private negotiation. The highest holding period in our sample is close to 
11.5 years.  
 
Figure 9: Number of Days from 1st Sale to Subsequent Sale (Only Include 






Our first test is an OLS hedonic price model for which we estimate the price 
function for separately for high and low rise properties.19  For each we segment the 
sample into those units that will be part of a later analysis of price changes, so they 
                                                 
19 All regressions include either building dummies (high-rise) or postal district dummies (low-rise), 
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are matched sales.  The results as presented in Table 7 show that high rise properties 
sold at the auction had a statistically significant lower price.  For low rise 
properties, the coefficient is negative, but not statistically different than zero. This 
result reinforces similar findings from many earlier papers. 
 
Table 7: Regressions Results on Log Sales Price (price per m2) 
 
 






















Dummy: =1 if 










Dummy: =1 if 
unit sold via 
private negotiated  
sale after failure 









Dummy: =1 if 












sold via private 
negotiated  sale 
after failure to 











Unit floor area -0.0005*** (0) 
-0.0004*** 
(0)   
Lot area   -0.001*** (0) 
-0.0001*** 
(0) 
Dummy: =1 if it 
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Dummy: =1 if the 









Dummy: =1 if 
market prices 











     
Number of 
Observations 76148 1861 222362 5564 
R-Squared 0.89 0.87 0.45 0.43 
     
Price for high rise is per m2 of floor area, for low rise per m2 of lot area. 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year, property price 
index at the date of sale and neighborhood (postal area) dummies and low rise 
properties include property type dummies.  
 




One of the advantages our data has is the use of condominium properties with other 
units in the same building acting as a control.  First, given that we have unit size 
and look at price per m2, this is an effective control for unobservables.   
 
Second, this effectively addresses part of the problem with unobserved structure and 
unit quality.  All units share the same structure, and even if an owner is behind on 
condominium fees, they still benefit from the council’s expenditure on the structure 
and public areas.  As well, within internal unit quality is unlikely to exhibit 
substantial cross-unit variation beyond that captured by unit size, as all units were 
built at the same time and to the same quality level; renovation being much more 
difficult and addition impossible for units in a multi-unit structure.  This control is 
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particularly useful in looking at foreclosure.  One of the assumptions in the 
literature on foreclosure is that the lower values reflect under-maintenance, and 
other problems with these units, and concern about a “lemon’s problem.”  The 
multi-family units with building fixed effects should eliminate nearly all of these 
concerns, leaving only a pure foreclosure effect of either stigma or the seller’s 
stronger desire to sell the unit. 
 
The foreclosure results are quite striking.  For multi-family units, foreclosure sales 
at auction essentially sell a higher price as any other unit.  In contrast, foreclosed 
low rise properties, where under-maintenance and asymmetric information on unit 
quality are an issue, sell at a discount, albeit the effect is statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that the pure foreclosure effect in the absence of under-maintenance 
and asymmetric information is a positive one, supporting the framework in Quan 
(2002). Comparing the two suggests an under-maintenance effect of approximately 
4 percent.   
 
The third element we examine is the subsequent sale by private negotiated sale of 
units that did not transact at the auction.  When these units are sold, they transact at 
a 3 to 5 percent lower price, a difference that is statistically different from zero. As 
this discount is statistically different from the auction price discount, it appears that 
either the price discovery process adversely affects these units, or that these units 
are inferior and hence do not sell at auction.  The interaction term between the units 
not sold at the auction but sold subsequently by private sale with institution 
(foreclosure) sale is statistically significant and negative only for high rise 
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properties.  However, for low-rise sales it does suggest institutions can get a higher 
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There are some critiques to behavioral economics and finance. One of the fiercest 
critics in behavioral finance literature is by Fama (1998) who contends that “market 
efficiency survives the challenge from the literature on long-term return anomalies”. 
Consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis that the anomalies are chance 
results, he claims, that apparent overreaction to information is about as common as 
underreaction, and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as 
frequent as post-event reversal. More importantly, consistent with the market 
efficiency prediction that apparent anomaly can be due to methodology, most long-
term anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique.  
 
As demonstrated in the earlier sections, the evidence of “anomalies” came from 
results involving one-off decisions. This thesis further attempts to ask “Will these 
‘anomalies’ still arise or persist in repeated market?” In this section, we will focus 
on loss aversion and the question to ask is basically “Whether loss aversion 
dissipates with repeated auctions?”  
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To my knowledge, few researches undertake to study human behavior in repeated 
market environment and all of them use experiments. Several studies have 
examined the effect of endowment over repeated market trials. However, the 
experimental results are not conclusive.  
 
Kahneman et al. (1990) found that the disparity between buying and selling values 
does not diminish over numerous repeated market iterations. However, two studies 
have found that if values are elicited using the Vickrey auction, the disparity 
disappears with repetition (Harless, 1989 and Shogren et al. 1994). Shogren et al 
(1994)’s finding suggests that repeated trials provide the discipline to help subjects 
learn their true valuations through interactions with the market  
 
Further work by Plott (1996) in his discovered preference hypothesis also suggests 
that rationality is a process of discovery’: when individuals face unfamiliar tasks, 
their behavior can be influenced by various biases, but with incentives and practice, 
they arrive at ‘considered choices’ that reflect stable underlying preferences (Plott, 
1996, p.248). Following Plott, Loomes el al. (2003) introduce a refining hypothesis 
which states that “if preferences satisfy standard consistency requirement, and if 
anomalies result from errors, this refining hypothesis predicts a tendency for 
anomalies to become less frequent as market experience accumulates. This 
hypothesis does not specify the mechanisms which promote error reduction.  
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Some economists have argued that anomalies behavior is economically significant 
only if it survives in an environment in which individuals repeatedly face the same 
decision problem (Buttimore, 1994, 1999). However the current literature based on 
experiments is not able to provide a conclusive result on the anomalies behavior. 
Hence this thesis attempts to bridge the knowledge gap of whether these anomalies 




6.3 Three Alternative Hypotheses of Learning in Repeated Markets 
 
Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (2001) consider three alternative hypotheses about 
how people learn in the repeated markets. 
 
 
6.3.1 Refining hypothesis 
 
The refining hypothesis states that market experience helps individual to make 
decisions that more accurately reflect their preferences. If preferences satisfy 
standard consistency requirements and anomalies result from errors, the refining 
hypothesis predicts a tendency for anomalies to become less frequent as market 
experience accumulates. Individuals refine their decision making ability through 
repetition, feedback and incentives. Repetition allows subjects to experience the 
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consequences of particular choices; incentives provide a general motivation to 
attend to tasks carefully. 
 
 
6.3.2 Market discipline hypothesis 
 
The market discipline hypothesis assumes that agents have stable underlying 
preferences and that they may commit errors when attempting to act on those 
preferences within a market institution. However, the market discipline hypothesis 
distinguishes between two types of errors: those which, ex post, are costly to the 
agent once the market outcome is known and those which are not. The hypothesis is 
that agents adjust their behavior to correct errors if and only if those errors have 
proved costly.  
 
 
6.3.3 Shaping hypothesis 
 
The shaping hypothesis states that, in repeated market environments, there is a 
tendency for agents to adjust their bids towards the price observed in the previous 
market period.  
 
In the experiment, subjects took part in a series of repeated auctions. All of the 
auctions were median price auctions which operated as follows. Each involved an 
odd number of participants, and a computer program elicited a bid from each 
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subject equal to the price which they were just not willing to trade. The medium bid 
was then computed and announced as the market price. The program implemented 
all trades consistent with subjects’ bids at the market price. So, in buying auctions, 
only subjects with bids above the market price bought; in selling auctions, only 
subjects with asks below the market price sold. The mechanism was a sealed bid, 
but subjects learned the market price, whether they had bought or sold, immediately 
at the end of each auction round. Their findings were consistent with the shaping 
hypothesis. The authors conclude: “The discovery of a shaping effect has 
potentially far-reaching theoretical consequences. For example, claims concerning 
the efficiency of competitive markets typically assume that preferences are 
independent of market activity. If it were the case that values are ‘contaminated’ by 
price feedback through market participation that would warrant serious 





To examine whether loss aversion will dissipate with repeated auction, we are 
extending the data and the two approaches used in Section 4. The first approach is 
to use OLS regression to study the effect of loss aversion on a unit’s sale price, 
either the price that the properties are sold either at the auction itself or via private 
negotiated sales after failure to sell at the auction. The second approach is to test a 
variant of probability of sale analysis, whether a unit is sold at auction or not. The 
sample is separated into sub-sample. One set consists of those with no repeat sales 
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and another set consists of those with repeated sales regardless the number of 
repeated attempts. In addition, we also tested the sub-sample with one repeated 
auction attempts to determine whether the greater the number of auction attempts, 
the lesser the adversity of loss.  
 
 
6.5 Results  
 
The results for both Tables 8A and 8B and Table 9 on loss aversion variable all 
indicate that loss aversion only exists in the first auction (Column 1 of Tables 8A, 
8B and 9). Interestingly, this supports the research that anomalies do disappear with 
repeated auctions. However, the results in Column 2 of the three tables indicate that 
adversity of loss is independent of the number of auction attempts.  
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Table 8A: Regressions on Log Sales Price (High Rise) – Repeated Auctions 
 (1) (2) (3) 







Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen for 























Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 



















Change in housing price index from1st 







Reference Point for Loss Aversion 
Measure 
Highest Over Holding Period20 





























    
Number of Observations 914 311 716 
R-Squared 0.54 0.67 0.59 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies; hedonic variables include whether unit is vacant, title is 
freehold, unit size (high-rise only), and lot size (low rise only) but are not in the 
table.    
 
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
   
                                                 
20 Similar conclusion holds when the reference point for loss aversion is taken to be the highest over 
the last 2 years 
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Table 8B: Regressions on Log Sales Price (Low Rise) – Repeated Auctions 
 (4) (5) (6)  







Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen for 























Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 



















Change in housing price index from1st 







Reference Point for Loss Aversion 
Measure 
Highest Over Holding Period21 
 





























    
Number of Observations 530 179 356 
R-Squared 0.68 0.76 0.75 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies; hedonic variables include whether unit is vacant, title is 
freehold, unit size (high-rise only), and lot size (low rise only); and auction variable 
is # of previous auction attempts but are not in the table.    
 
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
                                                 
21 Similar conclusion holds when the reference point for loss aversion is taken to be the highest over 
the last 2 years 
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Table 9: Probability Property Will Be Sold at Auction – All Sample 
(Logit for All Auction Attempts) – Repeated Auctions 
 (1) (2) (3) 

















Dummy: =1 if market prices have fallen 













Days from purchase to 1st auction date 0.001*** 
(0.0002)  
 
Days from highest price over holding 




Days from highest price over past 2 years 
prior to sale to 1st auction date   
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 






Dummy: =1 if unit is being sold by 








Reference Point for Loss Aversion 
Measure 
Highest Over Holding Period 





Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 




Loss aversion (relative to highest price 




Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over holding period) x 




Loss aversion (relative to highest price 
index over past 2 years prior to sale)   
-7.83 
(6.15) 
Interaction:  Loss aversion (relative to 
highest price index over past 2 years prior 
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Number of observations 2715 1138 2767 
Log likelihood -889 -255 -571 
    
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable of value = 1 if property is sold at auction and 
0 else 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  All the models include year and neighborhood 
(postal area) dummies.  Other variables included in the regression, but not shown 
here is interaction between loss aversion and low rise and dummy if unit is vacant.  
 
 ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Broadly, this thesis attempts to extend the current literature to give a better 
understanding of loss aversion in housing market. And secondly, it also attempts to 
examine the price anomaly in real estate auction. Lastly, it intends to bridge the 
knowledge gap by examining whether observed price “anomalies” diminish in a 
repeated market environment.  
 
This thesis is motivated based on the greater difficulty of standard economic theory 
to understand individual choice behavior. In standard economic theory, it relies on 
expected utility maximization, which implies that economic agents are capable of 
correctly identifying and maximizing their utility functions. It also assumes 
unlimited information processing capabilities. In other words, economic agents are 
rational. For instance, economic theory predicts that the prices that a person will 
pay to buy and sell an object should be about the same. But numerous experiments 
have shown that there is a large disparity between selling and buying prices. These 
are usually term as “anomalies” in economic theory. These “anomalies” depart from 
the optimal judgment and decision making. 
 
In the recent years, there are numerous efforts to capture psychologically more 
realistic notions of human nature into economics and finance. This is commonly 
labeled under the rubric “behavioral economics” and “behavioral finance.” The goal 
of psychological economics and finance is to investigate behaviorally grounded 
departures from these assumptions that seem economically relevant. 
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This thesis is mooted on the individual choice behavior by providing it with more 
realistic psychological foundations. It is based on the behavioral economics 
theories.  
 
An important groundwork on behavioral economics came from the prospect theory. 
The theory is developed by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. It is this theory that 
paved the development of behavioral economic and finance. The theory showed 
how judgement under uncertainty departs from the assumption of rationality. Unlike 
expected utility theory, prospect theory is descriptive and developed in an inductive 
way from empirical observations. Basically, individuals maximised weighted sum 
of utilities, which are determined by what Kahneman and Tversky call “value 
function”  
 
There are three main differences between the value function in prospect theory and 
utility function in expected utility theory. First, unlike utility function which is 
concerned with final values of wealth per se, prospect theory is concerned with 
changes in wealth, relative to a given reference point. Second, the slope of value 
function is asymmetric between gains and losses; the value function declines more 
for a given loss than it rises for a gain of the same amount. That is it is concave for 
gains and convex for losses. However, for utility function, the slope is smooth and 
concave throughout. Third, for both gains and losses, the marginal value for a 
change in wealth declines with the magnitude of the change. That is, people behave 
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as if they regard extremely improbable events as impossible and extremely probable 
events as certain.  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the thesis objectives is to provide a greater 
understanding of loss aversion in housing market. Loss aversion is proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect theory. This is based on the idea 
that the mental penalty experienced by an individual or agent associated with a 
given loss is greater than the mental reward from a gain of the same size. If 
investors are loss averse, they may be reluctant to realize losses.  
 
Hence unlike the utility function in expected utility theory which is taken to be 
smooth and concave everywhere, the value function in the prospect theory is S-
shaped. It is concave for gains and convex for losses, displaying diminishing 
sensitivity to change in both directions. Furthermore, it has a kink at zero, being 
steeper for small losses than for small gains. 
 
So far, many works have been done for loss aversion. However, they are all 
experimental studies. For instance, the experimental work by Knetsch (Knatch) and 
Tversky and Kahneman support loss aversion.  
 
Given that the works on loss aversion are carried out using experiments, the results 
are hence sensitive to: 
(1) Who participates and nature of instructions  
(2) The types of auction  
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In the housing market, the research of loss aversion is very limited. The first paper 
on loss aversion in the housing market is by Genesove and Mayer (2001). Using 
data on Boston condominium sales, they find that house owners are loss averse 
using transaction and list prices and time to sale. They also find that loss aversion is 
not a uniform aspect of participants in housing markets. Basically, investors exhibit 
less loss aversion than owners.  
 
An often-noted characteristic of housing markets that sets them apart from other 
asset markets is the positive correlation between housing prices and transaction 
volume. Stein (1995) argues that credit market imperfections that impose 
downpayment constraints on buyers can explain this phenomenon. In contrast, 
Engelhardt demonstrate that loss aversion as an alternative explanation for this 
phenomenon.  
 
The housing market is a fruitful place to test loss aversion because it is an 
infrequently traded asset. Unlike common goods such as pens and mugs, a person 
only gets to buy or sell a property few times in their life. Furthermore, housing is 
held for both investment and consumption purposes. The transaction data also allow 
researchers to identify asset acquisition and disposition dates and hence losses are 
measurable, which has been the challenge for other asset classes.  
This thesis uses auction data on housing from Singapore. Auction mechanisms have 
been extensively used as it provides an excellent platform for a better understanding 
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of human behavior. Unlike many other studies that use experiments, the data set 
used in this thesis are actual auction data.  
 
In the first part of the thesis, there are two research questions that attempts to 
examine on loss aversion. Firstly, what is the relevant reference point for evaluating 
losses in a prospect theory framework? Secondly, how does the sensitivity to loss 
vary across different types of sellers? 
 
The first part of the thesis attempts to make two primary contributions to the 
literature. First, we provide empirical evidence on the relevant reference point for 
prospect theory, specifically we examine whether losses are evaluated relative to the 
acquisition prices or the highest possible price the owner could have received over 
the holding period/recent past. 
 
Second, we examine whether there are differences in the extent of loss aversion 
across types of sellers. Genesove and Mayer (2001) compare owner-occupiers and 
investors; we extend this to look at the difference between individual (owners) 
sellers and institutional sellers. Institutional sellers are expected to be less sensitive 
to loss aversion than are individuals, be it they are more experienced or less 
emotionally connected to the unit. Individual sellers, on the other hand, are 
expected to be loss averse.  
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Our results suggest that loss aversion is evident. Probably our most robust result is 
that the relevant reference point for measuring the change in the value function is 
not the initial nominal purchase price, but rather the highest value. There are strong 
evidences for the reference points to be both the highest price and highest price over 
the most recent past.  Our other findings include that institutions are less susceptible 
to loss aversion than individuals.  Both prices and time to sale time to sale increase 
more for individuals than for institutions as the likely loss increases.  Like 
Genesove and Mayer (2001) we get a clear positive relationship between potential 
loss and the time to sale, where we measure this in a duration framework as the 
hazard for the probability of sale.  We also find that loss aversion is not present for 
all sellers in housing markets.  The motivated sellers do not hold out for higher 
prices.  However, they do take longer to sell their units.  A more robust finding is 
that experienced sellers, that is, institutions selling foreclosed units, are less affected 
by loss aversion than are individuals. 
 
The second part of the thesis focuses on the price anomalies observed in auction. 
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) attributed their findings for price premium as 
evidence of the “winner’s curse.” Winner’s curse is a phenomenon where under 
certain assumptions, successful bidders pay more than an item’s expected market 
value. On the other hand, Mayer (1995) attributed the discount to be the quick sale 
under the auction mechanism that results in poorer match between the buyer and 
house. 
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Foreclosed properties are usually sold at a discount (Shilling et al., 1990; Forgey et 
al., 1994; Hardin and Wolverton, 1996, Pennington-Cross, 2006). Hence, one 
problem in reaching any conclusion from this work might be the difficulty of 
differentiating the stigma of foreclosure associated with auctioned properties. As 
the auction data from Singapore consists of both sales by institution and individual 
owner, this thesis will be able to back out the pure foreclosure effect from the 
aggregate auction effect. This will provide a clearer understanding on the 
interaction between the winner’s curse associated with auction and the well 
documented finding on discount for foreclosed properties.  
 
The research questions that the second part of the thesis attempts to examine 
include (1) Is there any interaction between the phenomenon of expected premium 
at auction and discount for foreclosed properties; (2) Is price premium/discount 
uniform across market participants? Any differences due to bargaining power? (3) 
Between high and low rise properties, what is the extent of under-maintenance and 
asymmetric information that cause foreclosed properties to transact at a discount, 
that is, is there pure discount for foreclosed properties? (4) In the price discovery 
process, is there any price anomaly for units that are not sold at non-pooled auction 
but subsequently sold through private negotiation? Has bidders gained experience at 
auction?  
 
The results shed clear light on the existence of a premium or discount for auction 
sales, but also the relationship between under-maintenance and asymmetric 
information on unit quality and the price of units sold at foreclosure. 
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The third part of the thesis looks into whether anomalies behavior survives in a 
repeated market environment. In behavioral economics and finance, many 
anomalies behavior have been found but it is a one-off decision. Hence, some 
economists question the reliability of the findings as there are also some findings 
that showed the patterns of behavior that conformed to the standard economic 
theory. Hence, some economists have thereby argued that anomalies behavior is 
significant if it survives in an environment in which individuals repeatedly face the 
same decision problem (Binmore, 1994 and 1999).  
 
In this section, we will focus on loss aversion and the question to ask is basically 
“Whether loss aversion dissipates with repeated auctions?” We are extending the 
section on loss aversion to further examine this research question. Interestingly it is 
found in our research that anomalies do disappear with repeated auctions. However, 
the adversity of loss is independent of the number of auction attempts. 
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Define a unit’s i log market value at time t as Pit, and the current log market index 
as Pt . The observed transaction price of an individual unit depends on both the 
current market, the unit’s quality/quantity deviation from the market index, and the 
outcome of bargaining process between the buyer and seller vit. We assume that the 
price of the housing services delivered from the unit’s structure is a function of 
observable characteristics β(Xi) and unobserved quality ei. For convenience we 
assume that both are time-invariant relative to the market index. We assume further 
that both e and v are distributed with mean zero and each with its own variance. The 
observed transaction price of unit i at time t become: 
 
.)( itiitit veXPP          (1) 
 
Loss at time t Lit is defined as maximum of zero and the expected price at the 
reference point minus the current expected value.  So for a reference point of the 
unit’s value at time 0:  
 
 .)()(,0max 0 itiit PEPEL        (2) 
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Substituting from (1) into (2):  
 ).()())()(()(,0max 00 itiiiiitit vvEeeXXPPEL    (3)  
 
Eliminating the time invariant components reduces to an expression of the market 
index and the seller’s bargaining strength at times 0 and t. 
 
 .)()(,0max 00 ititit vvEPPEL       (4) 
 
If we impose the assumption that a seller expects her relative bargaining skill to be 
constant over time, so that in the population vit is mean zero, but individual i has 
E(vit) = E(vi,t+j), then the expected change in the price index will measure an 
owner’s expected loss aversion between any two dates. Lit will thus be a function of 
actual price index values for any analysis of loss aversion that involves current and 
past dates.   
 
 
